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Fiduciary Duties Under the
Commodity Exchange Act
Jeny W. Markham *
I. INTRODUCTION
Much commentary has been directed to the role of fiduciary
duties in commercial contexts, particularly under corporate and
federal securities laws. An important area of commerce that has
not attracted comparable attention is the trading of commodity
futures contracts.' This is unfortunate. As evidenced by such
events as the Stock Market Crash of 1987, the futures industry
plays an important role in the economy and is becoming critical
to the efficient operation of the securities markets.2 Moreover,
recent judicial and administrative decisions have left the law of
fiduciary duties in the futures industry in an uncertain and confus-
ing condition.3 This too is unfortunate, as well as unfair, to mar-
ket participants.
This Article reviews the nature and background of the fiducia-
ry duty concept, focusing on its traditional application under the
• Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The au-
thor wishes to express his appreciation to Thomas Hazen for his review and comments
on the Article.
1 A commodity futures contract is a bilateral contract pursuant to which the seller
(or "short") agrees to sell a specified amount of a specified commodity for delivery at a
stated date -in the future. Conversely, the purchaser (or "long") agrees to purchase the
contract. The terms of the contract are standardized. The only term that is negotiated is
the price. Orders for futures contracts are transmitted for execution to a pit on the floor
of the exchanges where floor traders and floor brokers compete for their execution.
2 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MEcHANISMs 55 (1988)
("From an economic viewpoint, what has been traditionally seen as separate markets-the
markets for stocks, stock index futures, and stock options-are in fact one inarket.").
Over twenty years before the 1987 crash, a congressional report found that the
"futures markets are playing an increasingly important role in the pricing and marketing
of the Nation's commodities." S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 18 (1974). Concern
was also expressed that "unsophisticated investors" were being "fleeced of their life sav-
ings." 120 CONG. REc. H2928 (Apr. 11,.1974) (remarks of Rep. Brown). To remedy such
concerns, a new federal agency was established, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). It was thought that this agency would be
"comparable in stature and responsibility to the Securities and Exchange Commission."
120 CONG. REc. S18,865 (Oct. 10, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
3 See infra notes 189-302 and accompanying text.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
law of trusts and its expansion into other fields. The Article exam-
ines the important economic role being played by the futures
markets. It then explores the nature of the participants in those
markets as a prelude to an analysis of their need for the protec-
tive umbrella of fiduciary duties. The Article also reviews govern-
mental efforts to impose fiduciary duties on the futures industry
and the less than enthusiastic reception of the courts to those
efforts.
Finally, the Article proposes the abandonment of further at-
tempts at applying across-the-board fiduciary duties in the futures
industry. To date, those duties have been so amorphous and un-
certain in nature as to be of little benefit to those supposedly
being protected. The uncertainty of their scope has also placed an
unnecessary burden on commodity professionals charged with such
duties. The Article advocates that specific rules be promulgated to
impose certain, special duties on commodity professionals in order
to benefit the limited class of customers who need such protec-
tion.
II. THE ROLE OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS
A. Hedging
Commodity futures trading began on the Chicago commodity
exchanges in the middle of the nineteenth century.4 Trading in
futures grew steadily over the years,5 and today, these markets
play an important role in the nation's economy.6 This is due prin-
cipally to the fact that futures contracts are used to hedge com-
mercial risks.
When used for hedging, futures markets effectively operate as
insurance contracts against adverse price changes.7 To illustrate, a
large trucking company is concerned that rising fuel costs will
4 WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOuS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 123-25
(1991); G. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE
UNITED STATES 28-29 (1932).
5 See generally 5 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE (1921);
JERRY MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION
(1987).
6 Supra note 2.
7 For a general discussion of hedging with futures, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982); United States v. New York
Coffee and Sugar Exch., 263 U.S. 611 (1924); United States v. Grady, 225 F.2d 410, 415
(7th Cir. 1955); THOMAS HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 107-08 (2d ed.
1977); Donald A. Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 215, 218-19 (1957).
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impair its profitability because its long-term haulage contracts do
not allow price adjustments for fuel price increases. To guard
against the risk of fuel price increases, the trucking company
could buy petroleum futures contracts on the New York Mercantile
Exchange. In the event fuel oil prices increase, the trucking com-
pany will experience a profit on the futures contract. The trucking
company can then use the profits to offset the increased prices
paid for the actual diesel oil. If prices were to instead decrease,
the trucking company would experience a loss on the futures
contract. That loss, however, would be offset by the decreased cost
of the actual diesel fuel. Consequently, whether prices went up or
down, the trucking company would assure itself of a stable price
for its fuel oil, and its profit margin would be assured.'
The same approach could be taken by the airline company
that fears another outbreak of violence in the Middle East, which
would cause a drastic increase in jet fuel prices. Similarly, large
commercial farmers can assure themselves of a specified price
before planting crops, and those concerned with interest rate risks
can guard against such dangers by using futures contracts on a
broad array of interest-bearing instruments."
Portfolio managers may also guard against market risks
through so-called stock index futures contracts. Indeed, many
institutional investors now seek to "index" their portfolios so as to
assure that they perform as well as the overall market. This is
because modern portfolio theory suggests that it may not be possi-
ble to outperform the market." Stock index futures can be used
to assist in this indexing or to guard against anticipated market
drops. For example, a portfolio manager anticipating a drop in
the stock market will not want to sell out a broad-based portfolio
because of the transaction costs involved. Moreover, the manager
may want to hold the securities on a long-term basis. In that situ-
ation, the portfolio manager can simply sell futures contracts on a
8 The failure to hedge may be a violation of the fiduciary duties of the directors of
a company with hedgeable price risks. Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. CL App.
1992). There may, however, be pitfalls in this process. See generally Ryder Energy Distrib.
Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1984).
9 See generally FEDERAL RESERVE Er AL, A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY
OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS 11-15 to II-20 (1984) [hereinafter TRADING N Fu-
TURES]; I TREASURY/FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY OF TREASURY FUTURES MARKETS 6-7 (May
1979).
10 See generally Thomas L Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L REV.
137 (1991).
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stock index in an amount equivalent to the value of the portfolio.
In the event of a market decline, the profits will offset the dimin-
ished value of the portfolio. In the event that the trader erred,
and the market does not drop, there will be a loss on the futures
cotrtacts that --& 'be ffie-t tkae, %2L 7Vv%- M%+ %Z&&~ ~
the error in judgment, therefore, becomes the relatively low trans-
action costs associated with the futures contracts plus the giving
up of the profits on the portfolio. If, however, the portfolio man-
ager is correct in his judgement, then the profitability of the port-
folio will be much enhanced."
Futures contracts also make available a broad array of strate-
gies for traders. These include such things as dynamic hedging,
arbitrage transactions, and so-called program trading. Dynamic
hedging involves complicated strategies used to adjust hedges to
meet changing market conditions.12 Arbitrage transactions are
many and complicated in form, but generally involve an effort to
take advantage of price disparities between markets, including the
cash markets and related futures or options contracts.'3 Program
trading involves computerized programs that signal traders when
to buy or sell upon the occurrence of certain market events.
14
Concerns have been expressed that these exotic trading strate-
gies could lead to a market "melt down" 5 or a "cascade scenario"
in which program trading would generate sell orders in the face
of a falling market in ever increasing amounts. Some market par-
ticipants thought this could result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of
succeeding waves of falling market prices to the point where the
market collapses." The Stock Market Crash of 1987 did little to
assuage such concerns.17 Indeed, that trauma raised grave con-
cerns as to whether the existing regulatory structure is adequate to
11 See generaly REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMs 7
(Jan. 1988) [hereinafter MARKET MECHANISMS]; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AND ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC BULLS & BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS & INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 79-80 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter BULLS AND BEARS]; SEC DIVISION OF MARKET
REGULATION REPORT, The October 1987 Ma*et Break 1-1 to 1-2 (Feb. 1988).
12 NICHOLAS DEB KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT
ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES 10-11 (1987).
13 SEC DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE ROLE OF INDEX-REATED TRADING IN
THE MARKET DECIjNE ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12-1986 5-6 (1987).
14 KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 10-11.
15 Id. at 1; Martin Mayer, Some Watchdog! How the SEC Helped Set the Stage for Black
Monday, BARRON'S, Dec. 28, 1987, at 18.
16 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETs: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON
THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 31 (1987).
17 See genera ly MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 11.
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deal with the enlarged role being played by futures contracts in




Price discovery is another benefit of the futures markets. It is
thought that traders bring information to the market. 9 That in-
formation sets prices in the trading pits by competitive auction
bids and offers. Those prices are then widely reported through
newspapers and on radio and television.2" Farmers depend on
these price reports to determine what crops to plant or when to
market their livestock. Futures prices also provide a mechanism for
determining the value of precious metals,2 ' for pricing oil,22 and
even for pricing the securities markets. This is an important
economic contribution, and this pricing function underscores the
importance of the futures markets to the national and interna-
tional economy.
C. Speculation
Speculators are necessary to provide liquidity to the market-
place. Speculators offset the risks of hedgers and provide a source
of liquidity when hedging risks cannot exactly be offset in the
marketplace. 4 That is, commercial firms requiring sales transac-
tions to hedge risks will not exactly offset, either in time or quan-
tity, the hedging needs of other commercial firms with risks that
involve the purchase of futures contracts. Speculators fill this gap
and provide the cushion and liquidity necessary to assure that
18 See genera//y Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCIay Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of
1987-The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. LJ. 1993 (1988).
19 BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 11, at 71.
20 HiERONhymUs, supra note 7, at 35.
21 Se, g., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at D13 (futures price reports in metals and
oil trading on United States exchanges); FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at 30 (same).
22 Se, eg., N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21, at D13; FIN. TIMES, supra note 21, at 30.
23 An SEC staff study concluded that:
[Als a result of the increasing use of the futures markets by institutional inves-
tors,... the character of the market has changed to the point where the
"price discovery" feature of the derivative [futures] market is leading, rather than
following, price trends in the underlying equity markets.
MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 11, at 36.
24 CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 109 (Lloyd Besant et al.
eds., 1985).
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hedging transactions can be effected. Speculators also bring infor-
mation to the marketplace to aid its pricing function.2
Of course, excessive speculation is not desirable. It may distort
prices and prevent the efficient operation of the marketplace.
Excessive speculation can cause a market collapse and loss of pub-
lic confidence. 26 To lessen these concerns, Congress has autho-
rized limits on the amount of speculation that may be engaged in
by any one trader or group of traders acting together.
2 7
D. Growth of the Futures Markets
The commodity futures markets have grown dramatically in
recent years. In 1970, trading volume for all futures contracts was
some thirteen million contracts.28 By 1980, annual volume had
increased to over ninety million contracts.' In 1990, volume was
over two hundred and seventy million contracts.' A large part of
this growth was attributable to the creation of so-called financial
futures contracts such as index futures contracts and futures on
government securities. Virtually nonexistent before 1970, trading
in financial futures grew to over forty million contracts by 1982,31
and by 1990, financial futures accounted for some one hundred
eighty million of the futures contracts traded that year.3 2 Finan-
cial futures transactions now far outnumber agricultural futures,
which had been the initial basis for futures trading.33
Traders in the futures markets have also undergone a meta-
morphosis. In the 1930s, the Department of Agriculture conducted
25. See generally United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 838 (1985); COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE NATURE, Ex-
TENT AND EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING BY PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL, NON-PUBLIC
INFORMATION 14 (1984); MARK J. POWERS, GErING STARTED IN COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING 17-18 (4th ed. 1983).
26 This danger has been expressly recognized by Congress. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1988). See
generally John H. Stassen, Propaganda as Positive Law: &cion 3 of the Commodity Exchange Act
(A case Study of How Economic Facts Can Be Changed by Act of Congress), 58 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 635 (1982).
27 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
28 FUTURES INDUS. ASS'N, VOLUME OF FUTURES TRADING: 1960 THROUGH 1989 (1989).
29 Id.
30 CFrC ANN. RE'. 95 (1990).
31 Y.L.A. Eason, Financial Futures: A Hot New Act; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1983, at 1.
32 CFTC, supra note 30, at 87. This figure includes futures contracts on foreign cur-
rencies and precious metals, as well as interest rate and index futures. It does not in-
clude options contracts traded on futures exchanges.
33 Id.; see Barbara Donnelly, Goldman Pitches Commodity Futures as Safe and Yield-Bearing
Investments, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1991, at C1 (Wall Street is seeking to increase trading in
a commodity futures contracts).
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a survey of futures market participants. This survey revealed that
the largest number of traders were farmers.' Their overall com-
mercial sophistication, especially in an area as complex as futures
trading, was questionable. 5 Moreover, many of the individual
speculators participating in the futures markets were unsophisticat-
ed individuals. For example, the Department's survey found that
market participants included six dead men, eighteen undertakers,
twelve candy store proprietors, and a large number of laborers,
students, manicurists, widows, secretaries, stenographers,
housewives, and unemployed individuals. A number of doctors,
dentists, and lawyers were also in the market.'
In 1949, a government report reviewed trading in some 9,000
commodity futures accounts. Almost one-third of the traders were
sophisticated traders engaged in business in some form. Farmers
were also numerous, as were a "surprisingly large number of re-
tired persons," and there were also a number of clerical personnel
trading. In addition, there were numerous professionals such as
lawyers and doctors."7 The report also found that the great ma-
jority of individual speculators lost money in the futures markets.
Their net losses were six times their net profits.'
A 1970 survey of traders showed a somewhat more sophisticat-
ed profile of individual futures speculators. By this time, small
nonprofessional traders were generally well educated, over forty-
five years of age, and earned over $10,000 per year in 1970 dol-
lars. Most of these traders were lawyers, doctors, dentists, and
business professionals.3 9 A 1978 market survey of financial futures
traders also found that professionals and institutions dominated
overall trading. Although that survey showed continued participa-
tion by a number of retired persons, housewives, students, and
other nonprofessionals, they were responsible for only a small
portion of total trading.4
34 D.B. BAGNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CIRcuLAR No. 397, ANALISis OF OPEN COM-
MTMENTs IN WHEAT AND CORN ON THE CHIcAGO BOARD OF TRADE 8 (1986), norad in
Campbell, supra note 7, at 220 n.20.
35 Legislative reports and hearings during this period are replete with claims that
farmers were being fleeced directly or indirectly by large operators on the futures mar-
kets. Sw gmsfai MARKHAM, supra note 5, at 22-26.
86 CONG. REc. S8289-8298 (May 29, 1936).
37 BLAIR STEWART, USDA TECHNICAL BULLETiN No. 1001, AN ANALYSIS OF SPECULA-
TiE TRADING IN GRAIN FUTURES 46 (1949).
" 38 Id at 129-30.
39 POWERs, supra note 25, at 10-11.
40 RONALD B. HOBSON, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, FUTURES TRADING IN
1992]
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A 1984 survey enhanced this picture even more. By then,
individual or noncommercial traders held less than one-third of
outstanding financial futures contracts.4 1 Ninety percent of those
individual traders had attended college and about forty percent
had graduate or professional degrees. A majority of these individu-
als had net worths (excluding residence and personal effects) in
excess of one hundred thousand dollars. In fact, twenty-eight per-
cent of individual stock index futures traders had net worths in
excess of five hundred thousand dollars. Only five to twelve per-
cent of these noncommercial index traders had net worths of less
than twenty-five thousand dollars.
42
These figures demonstrate that the market is dominated by
large or sophisticated traders. Nevertheless, a small number of
participants can rightfully be viewed as relatively poor, unsophisti-
cated individuals. Their role in the futures markets, however, con-
tinues to diminish. Today some seventy-five percent of futures
contracts are held by commercial firms and professional traders.
Only about one quarter of futures contracts involve small individu-
al,. noncommercial traders. Presumably, if the 1984 trend contin-
ues, most of that shrinking cadre would be well educated and
relatively wealthy.4"
This evolution in the makeup of the market paralleled devel-
opments in the securities markets where institutional traders have
also become dominant.44 Indeed, it was these institutional traders
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (1978).
41 TRADING IN FUTURES, supra note 9, at IV-7.
42 IzE at V-4 to V-5.
43 BULLs AND BEARS, supra note 11, at 72-73. Brokerage firms are increasing their
marketing efforts to induce even more institutional investors into the futures markets. See,
e.g., Stanley W. Angrist, The Big Money Gives Futures a MWir, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1992, at
Cl; Donnelly, supra note 33; see also Michael Siconolfi, PaineWebber Cancels Futures Fund;
Firm Loses $1.2 Million Arbitration, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1991, at C21. Small investors con-
tinue to express less interest in the market.
44 Direct stock ownership by individuals dropped from approximately 84% in 1965
to about 53% last year. William Power, Small Investor Continues to Give up Control of Stocrs,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 1992, at C1. The phenomena of increased institutional trading in
the securities markets has been occurring for some time. An SEC study found that, in
1970, institutions held some 40% of equity securities, up from 26% in 1958. Institutional
Investor Study, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d
Cong. 1st Sess. IX (1971). "Small investors have been leaving the stock market for about
twenty years, a trend that accelerated in 1987." BuLLs AND BEARS, supra note 11, at 28.
Today, institutional trading constitutes a majority of the securities markets with institution-
al assets growing from $2.1 trillion in 1981 to $5.2 trillion in 1988. Id. at 32-33. See gen-
erally Randall Smith, Mutual Funds Have Become Dominant Buyers of Stock, WALL ST. J., May
22, 1992, at Cl.
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who turned to the futures markets to hedge their financial risks
and to take advantage of the low transaction costs and liquidity of
the futures markets. The Stock Market Crash of 1987 is also proof
of the dominant role of the institutions. During that period, insti-
tutions were selling billions of dollars worth of futures contracts in
very short periods of time. For example, on October 9, 1987
("Black Monday"), portfolio insurers sold futures contracts equiva-
lent in value to some four billion dollars of stock.'
The changing nature of the futures markets raises serious
questions as to whether fiduciary duties and their attending costs
should be imposed on an industry in which only a small number
of traders are so ill-educated or impoverished as to need such
protection. Nevertheless, to leave even this small number of trad-
ers without adequate regulatory safeguards seems harsh, particular-
ly since these markets are held open to the public under an exclu-
sive federal regulatory umbrella.' Before examining those issues,
however, a review of the nature and background of fiduciary du-
ties and their application to the futures industry is needed.
Ill. THE FIDUCIARY DuTy CONCEPT
A. Beginnings
Fiduciary duties stem from the law of trusts. Some scholars
assert that trusts originated in ancient Roman law,47 while others
claim that trusts arose from fifth-century German law.4" Still oth-
45 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKEr MECHANISMS 36 (1988).
Coming to Terms With Futures, THE ECONOMIsT, Nov. 23, 1991, at 85 (discussion of the
continuing dangers of large scale futures traders).
46 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1988) (transactions in futures "are affected with a national public
interest" and "are carried on in large volume by the public generally .... rendering
regulation imperative for the protection of... commerce and the national public inter-
est.").
47 One author traced the trust concept to the Roman law of 170 B.C. H.L. Wilgus,
Corporations and Express Trusts as Business Organizations, 13 MICH. L. REV. 71, 83 (1914).
Justice Story also traced the fiduciary duties imposed on partnerships to Roman law. J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, 261 (1841), noted in Donald J.
Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW.
427, 465 (1991); see also Kenneth W. Curtis, The Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary
Principles into the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 LOY. LA. L. REV. 795,
797 (1987) (fiduciary duty concept is derived from the Roman law).
48 Ann Van Wynen Thomas, Note on the Origin of Uses and Trusts-Waqfs, 3 Sw. LJ.
162 (1949).
One scholar on trusts and fiduciary duties found a breach of fiduciary duty by a
steward in the Bible. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciay Prindpa, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539 (1949).
An early mention of the trust concept is also found in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice
19921
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ers assert that trusts originated from concepts developed under Is-
lamic law that were brought to England by the returning Crusad-
ers.49 Whatever the case, the Statute of Uses that was adopted in
England in 1536 firmly cemented the trust concept into English
jurisprudence.'
The trust concept was thereafter expanded and developed
more fully by the equity courts in England."' In the words of
Professor Maitland, "Of all the exploits of equity, the largest and
most important is the invention and development of the trust." 2
The English courts even went so far as to suggest that the trust
relationship is a "principle of humanity" and that it exists for
"preservation of mankind."5 3 By the late 1800s, the law of trusts
was a separate branch of the law of England.'M At the turn of the
century, some twenty percent of the capitalized value of all English
assets were held in trust.
55
The trust concept was largely, if not exclusively, borrowed by
the United States from England."6 By the late 1800s, the law of
See Duties and Dangers of Trustees, 118 LAW TIMES 299 (1905).
49 Thomas, supra note 48. The trust may have been in existence in England even
before the Crusades. Wilgus, supra note 47, at 85.
50 AusnTN W. SCOIT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 1 (3d ed. 1967); Austin
W. Scott, The Trusts as an Instrument of Law Reform, 31 YALE LJ. 457, 462-63 (1922) [here-
inafter Law Reform] (discussing Statute of Uses).
Another form of trust, the bailment, traces its history to the thirteenth century. 2 F.
PoLLcK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 155 (2d ed. 1898); Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
51 The application of trust law in the Chancery courts appears to have first received
wide notice in Keech v. Sanford, 25 E.R. 223 (1726). By 1737, Lord Hardwicke was cred-
ited with creating a "science of trust law" in England. Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke
and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME LAW. 319, 322 (1935-36).
52 Austin W. Scott, The Progress of the Law, 1918-19: Trusts, 33 HIARv. L. REv. 688
(1919-20).
Professor Maitland also stated, "If we were asked what was the greatest and most
distinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence, I cannot
think that we could have any better answer to give than that this, namely, the develop-
ment from century to century of the trust idea." 3 MAITLAND, COLLECrED PAPERS 271,
272 (1911), noted in Law Reform, supra note 50, at 457.
53 Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 285 (1989)
(citations omitted).
"It was chiefly by means of uses and trusts that the feudal system was undermined
in England." Law Reform, supra note 50, at 457.
54 Ernest A. Jelf, Where to Find Your Law, 99 LAW TIMES 396 (1895).
55 W.G. Hart, The Law of Trusts, 127 LAw TIMES 535 (1909). England even estab-
lished a very successful Office of Public Trustee to administer trusts of those who wanted
to commit their funds to government management. Murry L. Jacobs & Edmund N. Cahn,
The Fiduciay of the Future, 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 32, 40 (1930-31).
56 A treatise on trust law in the United States published in 1882 cited some 200
cases, of which some 175 were from English law reports, while the remaining cases where
[Vol. 68:199
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trusts had become so sufficiently established in the United States
that the Harvard Law School was able to offer a separate course
on the subject.5 A survey by the American Banker's Association
also determined that by 1929 more than a thousand millionaires
were employing trust devices for the disposal of their estates.
Trusts managed by banks exceeded one hundred thousand in
number, and assets held by banks and trusts exceeded five billion
dollars." Although the Stock Market Crash of 1929 was a setback
for trustees,59 its effects were not permanent. By 1975, bank trust
departments were managing some $400 billion of assets and pri-
vate noninsured pension funds amounted to approximately $125
billion.' Today, a large proportion of securities are held by insti-
from courts on the Atlantic coast. Austin W. Scott, Fifly Years of Trusts, 50 HAPv. L REv.
60 (1936).
In the intervening two and half centuries [from the introduction of the trust in
England], the notion of the high standard incumbent on a fiduciary has spread
from its original homeland in the law of trusts has subjected a diverse variety of
entrepreneurs-directors, partners, agents, employees-to its colonizing sway.
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciay Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO LJ. 1 (1975).
57 Scott, upra note 56. The first article published in the Harvard Law Review was
also concerned with the law of trusts. See J.B. Ames, Purchaser for Value Without Notice, 1
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1887).
58 Henry A. Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust- Instruments, 42 YALE UJ. 359 (1933);
see also N. Gilbert Riddle, Trust Investments: Their Extent and Some Related Economic Problems,
5 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 339 (1938) (discussion of the extent of assets held in trust in
the United States during the 1930s). These figures reflect the fact that the corporate or
bank trustee had become a thriving business as a result of the complexity and popularity
of trusts. Leonard S. Fulton, On the Advantages and Limitations of Corporate Trustees, With
Special Reference to the Public Trustee of England, 34 LAW Q. REV. 304 (1818); Jacobs. &
Cahn, supra note 55 (a major development in the law of trusts was the determination to
allow corporations to be trustees); see also Randall J. LeBoeuff, National Banks as Fiducia-
ries in New York, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 128 (1920) (discussion of banks as fiduciaries). For a
discussion of particular concerns raised by bank trustees, see Comment, Fiduciaries-Slf
Dealing-Requirement of Two Parties to a Contract, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1405 (1937). See also
Diane S. Lacandro, Note, The Comptroller's Regulation-an illusoy Remedy to the Fiduciavy
Dilemma of National Banks in Light of Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 9 LoY. U. CFH.
L.J. 667 (1978) (discussion of conflicting fiduciary duties that bank trust departments may
encounter).
59 The stock market crash of 1929 resulted in some serious dilemmas for trustees.
For example, there was concern that trustees could be surcharged for failing to sell or
for delays in selling trust investments in a drastically declining market. George G. Bogert,
The Trustee's Duty with Regard to Conversion of Investments, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1933).
Bogert stated that, "Since 1929 the great reductions in the market prices of bonds and
stocks, the defaults in interest payments, the passing of dividends, and the shrinkage of
security margins on mortgages, have all raised questions as to the suitability of various
trust investments." Id. at 28; see also George P. Woodruff, Legal and Investment Standards of
Trustees, 4 FoRDHAM L. REv. 391 (1935) (the melting away of stock and bond prices
following the stock market crash of 1929 posed special problems for trustees).
60 Edward S. Herman, Conjiets of Interest in Commercial Bank Trust Departments and
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tutions with fiduciary duties for the investment of those holdings,
particularly pension funds.6 1 Their holdings are now valued in
the trillions of dollars.62 These figures reflect Professor Scott's
view that the trust is "the most effective instrument in effecting
the disposition of private property.6
B. The Law of Trusts
The law of trusts, as developed from English law and its trans-
plantation in the United States, holds that a "trust" relationship
exists between an administrator, or "trustee," who controls certain
special relationships. The beneficiary of that relationship is the
cestui que trust. This special "fiduciary" relationship imposes duties
and obligations on the trustee that are not found in contractual
arms-length relationships.'
"The most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the bene-
ficiaries of the trust is the duty of loyalty."' This duty intensifies
in a trust relationship where the trustee is acting in his own inter-
ests.' "The trustee, like the executor, the guardian, or the agent,
and similar parties, owes the one whom he represents a duty to
act solely in the interests of the beneficiary; he is not permitted to
consider his own personal advantage. " 7 This means, for example,
that a trustee may not profit at the expense of the beneficiary.6
Cotporate Fund Asset Management, 114 T. & EST. 786 (1975); Joseph V. Rizzi, Trustee In-
vestment Powers: Imprudent Application of the Prudent Man Rule, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 519
(1975).
61 See generally BULLS AND BEARS, supna note 11, at 28-29.
62 WILLIAM M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY THE WEALTH AND
POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INvEsroRs 25-39. (1992).
63 Scott, supra note 52.
64 The English courts seemed to recognize that there can be no "universal, all pur-
pose definition of the fiduciary relationship." R.P. Austin, Note, Commerce and Equi-
y--Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Trust, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 444, 445-46 (1986).
65 2 AUSTIN W. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 856 (1939). The law seeks the undivided
loyalty of the trustee. John G. Aldridge, Note, Trusts-The North Carolina Fiduciary Powers
Act and The Duty of Loyalty, 45 N.C. L REV. 1141 (1967).
The New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed this duty of loyalty stating that it
is "elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and. undiluted loyalty to those
whose interests the fiduciary is to protect." It is an "inflexible rule of fidelity." Birnbaum
v. Birubaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989). For a general description of fiduciary
obligations, see P.D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS (1977).
66 SCOTT, supra note 65, at 909; see also Roger A. Clapp, A Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty
3 MD. L. REv. 221 (1939) (discussing judicial decision rendered in 1726 on a trustee's
duty of loyalty).
67 GEORGE BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 3 (2d
ed. rev. 1984).
68 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (4th ed.
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Moreover, "[i]f the fiduciary enters into a transaction with the
beneficiary and fails to make a full disclosure of all circumstances
known to him affecting the transaction, or if the transaction is
unfair to the beneficiary, it can be set aside by him."6 A trustee
making a contract for the benefit of the trust may be held person-
ally liable.70 The trustee may also be held liable for the negli-
gence of agents hired by the trustee.7 ' Legislative efforts were
undertaken, however, to ease this near strict liability72 that some-
times caused "widespread terror and desolation among trustees."
73
1987). See generally Austin W. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 27
COLUM. L REv. 269 (1917).
Lord Hardwicke said that, "[A] trust is an office necessary in the concerns between
man and man, and if faithfully discharged, attending with no small degree of trouble
and anxiety, so that it is an act of great kindness in anyone to accept it." Knight v. Earl
of Plymouth, 1 Dick. 120, 126, 21 Eng. Rep. 214, 216 (1747), noted in G.M.U. Young,
Trustee Investment Standards and Responsibilities in England-Past and Present, 11 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 711, 711 (1976).
69 1 SCOTT & FRATCHEP, supra note 68, at 43 ("These are characteristics of all fidu-
ciary relations, although they.are to be found in a peculiarly intense degree in the rela-
tion between trustee and beneficiary."); see Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 552-56
(1846) (stating that trustees should not conduct business with the trust estate); John M.
Hadsall, Conflict of Interest When a Trustee Invests Trust Funds 14 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 329
(1935-36).
70 Austin W. Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts, 28 HARv. L. REV.
725, 725 (1915).
71 Id. at 726. This is because "[n]othing is better settled than that the trustee is not
an agent of the cestui que trust" Id. at 736. Liability may also fall on a passive trustee for
mere negligent acts. See'Wych v. East India Co., 3 P. Wins. 309, 24 Eng. Rep. 1078 (Ch.
1734), noted in Alvin E. Evans, Note, The Colluding and the Mistaken Trustee, 17 KY. UJ.
382, 383 (1929) (discussing the effects of negligent nonaction by a trustee); see also Ben-
jamin Harris, Jr., Comment, Liability of a Trustee: Balancing Gains Against Losses, 23 KY. L.J.
338 (1935) (trustees are not allowed to offset gains from one breach of- trust against
losses from another breach of trust). See generally George G. Bogert, The Liability of an
Inactive Co-trustee, 34 HARV. L REV. 483 (1920).
72 The Judicial Trustees Act of 1896, 150 LAW TIMES 543 (1898). It was thought by
some that perhaps the standards 'for trustees were too high because their formulation
had been left entirely to chancery judges:
Now please mark that trustee-law has grown up under chancellors and equity
judges, who whilst laying down-or rather building up-trustee-law have not
been aided by juries in finding facts, and have not been obliged to guide juries
by stating law to them. This absence of the jury element has had a most impor-
tant bearing- no jury would have condemned trustees as chancellors have done,
and no chancellor would have laid down to juries laws which chancellors have
unconsciously by degrees formulated and evolved, whilst under no obligation to
express them in clear language to non-legally educated minds.
The Difficulties and Dangers Encountered by Trustees When Acting as (a) Vendors, (b) Purchasers,
and (c) Mortgagors-Mr. Ince's Bill "To Amend the Law Relating to the Liabilities and Duties of
Trustes-T7e Status of Solicitors, 80 LAW TIMES 169 (1886).
73 The Duty and Peils of Trustees in the Investment of Trust-Funds, 48 LAW TIMES 250
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Trustees also became subject to a number of limitations on
their handling and investment of trust property. For example, at
an earlier period, trustees were not allowed to lend on the credit
of individuals "however unimpeachable their credit may be.
"74
Additionally, while trustees could invest trust property, "they must
be careful to lend no more than two-thirds of the value of the
mortgaged property, if it be land." 5
At an early stage in English law, equity chancellors allowed
trustees to invest trust funds in joint stock companies.7 Trustees
could also safely invest in the stock of the East India Company,
but they were left with such delicate questions as whether they
could participate in a "commutation" of that stock without court
approval that could not be obtained before subscriptions for the
commutation were filled.7 Unfortunate experiences, such as the
South Sea Island Bubble, suggested that stricter standards were
needed.78 Eventually, the chancery court in England adopted a
rule that precluded investments by trustees in anything other than
government securities.
9
In the United States, a "prudent" trustee rule evolved from an
1830 decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In
Harvard College v. Amory,a° the court stated that in making trust
investments, trustees must use "sound discretion" and must act in
the same manner as "men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
(1870).
The role of the trustee was described by one early commentator as being "burden-
some, thankless, unremunerative to the unskilled almost dangerous. The trustee must
derive no benefit or advantage from his position. He must not even take a few days
shooting over the estate; game rights must be left for the benefit of the trust estate."
Duties and Dangers of Trustees, 118 LAW TIMES 299 (1905). For a discussion of the more
modem duties of trustees in England, see William F. Fratcher, Fiduciay Administration in
England, 40 N.Y.U. L REV. 12 (1965).
74 A Practical Summay of the Law of Trustees, 27 LAW TIMES 170 (1856) (emphasis in
original).
75 Id-
76 Ellen L. Nylund, Investments by Trustees, 20 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 331, 331-32 (1942).
77 Trustees and the Commutation of East India StocA, 56 LAW TIMES 193 (1874). A com-
mutation apparently involves an exchange of securities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280-81
(6th ed. 1990).
78 For a discussion of the South Sea Island Bubble and its effect on trust law in
England, see Young, supra note 68.
79 See generally Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Mod-
em Portfolio Themy 69 N.C. L. REV. 87, 88 (1990).
80 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 454, 446 (1830).
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the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested.""' The courts in the United States, however, split
on whether a trustee could prudently invest in corporate securi-
ties.8
2
Later, state legislatures adopted "legal" lists of securities that
specified particular investments that could be legally made by
trustees of trust funds.' Initially, those lists did not permit invest-
ment of trust funds and common stocks, but the statutes were
gradually eased to allow such investments." Trustees were also
allowed to include the corpus of several trusts into so-called com-
mon trust funds, which allowed large scale management even for
small trust funds.' In addition, several states came to recognize
modem portfolio theory that assesses a portfolio as a whole and
81 Id. at 469 at 461. The prudent-person rule envisions:
The preservation of the trust estate and not the risking of it in the hope of in-
creasing its value, is the true policy. The trustee must exercise his own judgment
and use such care and skill as he has in making the investments. This ordinarily
involves investigation as to the safety of the investment and the probable income
to be derived therefrom. He must prudently avoid placing 'all his eggs in one
basket' and is required so to diversify his investments as to minimize the risk of
a considerable loss. In addition, the trustee must be constantly vigilant in his
maintenance of the trust estate.
Stuart M. Wright, The Measure of the Trustee's Liability for Improper Investments, 80 U. PA. L.
REv. 1105, 1106 (1932) (footnotes omitted).
82 See Ernest G. Strand, New York's Partial Prudent Man Rule, 25 N.Y.U. L REv. 583
(1950). For a discussion of the evolution of the so-called prudent-person rule, see Rizzi,
supra note 60. See also Edward V. Atnally, The Investment ResonsiUlities of Fiduciaras, 114
TR. & EST. 286 (1975) (discussing the continuance of the prudent-person rule in New
York); David M. Tralins, Contemporary Fiduciary Investments: Why Maryland Needs the Prudent-
Man Rule, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 207 (1983) (discussing the prudent-person rule).
The prudent-person rule has been adopted by other countries. See, eg., Frank J.
Finn & Peter A. Ziegler, Prudence and Fiduciary Obligations in the Investment of Trust Funds,
61 AUSrT. LJ. 329 (1987).
83 For a discussion of legal lists, see Gustav B. Margraf, Laws Relating to the Investment
of Trust Funds, 1930-1937, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 399 (1938); D. W. Markham, Trust
Investments in North Carolina 14 N.C. L REv. 160 (1935); William R. White & Irving AJ.
Lawres, The Modernization of Lega Lists, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 386 (1938).
In 1871, the Massachusetts legislature allowed courts to authorize trustees to invest
in mortgages to repair or rebuild buildings. This was done in order to finance the re-
building of Boston after its Great Fire. Comment, The Development of the Powers of Trustees,
47 HARV. L REv. 510, 514-15 (1934).
84 Colorado, for example, amended its constitution in 1950 to eliminate a prohibi-
tion against the investment of trust funds in common stocks and corporate bonds.
Charles A. Baer, The 'Prudent-Man Rule" NAow Applies to Investments by Fiduciaries, 28 DIcrA
213 (1951); see also Loren C. Ipsen, Trends in the Liability of Corporate Fiduciaries, 24 IDAHo
L. REV. 443 (1988) (discussing the evolution of the prudent-person standard).
85 Comm. on Inv. by Fiduciaries, Investments by Fiduciaries in Common Trust Funds, 11
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 28 (1976).
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allows the introduction of risk elements for diversity and other
purposes into a prudently managed portfolio.' These investments
may include futures and options, which had long been considered
the most speculative of ventures.
8 7
C. Expansion of the Fiduciary Concept
Trusts "are in their essence a social institution, " ' and the
concept had enough elasticity that equity courts could use trust
concepts to deal flexibly and remedially with special relationships
other than formal trusts.' The courts in England eventually rec-
ognized that some relationships to which trust principles were ap-
plied were not trusts in the true sense of the word.90 For this
86 One author has asserted that legal notions of investment prudence by fiduciaries
have still been left far behind by changes in the markets and economic concepts. BEVms
LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRuDENT-MAN RULE (1986). For
a discussion of the modem day application of the prudent-person rule, see John W.
Church, Jr. & Richard B. Seidel, Rearming the Prudent Man, 125 TR. & EST. 24 (1986);
Henry T.C. Hu, Risk Time, and Fiduciary Principles and Corporate Investment, 88 UCLA L
REV. 277 (1990); William J. Wilkie, Dfining Fiduciary Prudence. How Old Standards are Ap-
plied to Modern Situations, 125 TR. & EST. 29 (1986). See generally Secondary Mortgage
Market Enhancement Act, Pub. L No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1988) (federal statute expanding the "legal" investments of federally insured
financial institutions). A committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is also now revising the Uniform Principal and Income Act to rec-
ognize modem portfolio management by fiduciaries.
87 Haskell, supra note 79, at 90-91. See generally Louis A. Laurino, Investment Respon-
sibility of Professional Trustees, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 717 (1977) (discussing the prudent
man rule for corporate trustees); Bevis Longstreth, Tailoring Prudence. Using Circumstances,
Not Absolutes, to Judge Fiduciaries, 125 TR. & EST. 14 (1986); Comment, Prudent Trustee's In-
vestment in Common Stock - Permissive or Mandatory, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 788 (1958) (discuss-
ing the prudent man rule); Note, Standard of Care for Corporate and Professional Trustees, 42
VA. L. REV. 665 (1956).
If used as a hedging device, instruments such as futures and options may actually
decrease risk. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; see also Louis S. Headley, A
Trustee in a World of Changing Values, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 355 (1938) (discussing
the trustee's duties to maintain purchasing power of a trust and the dilemma that this
presents to a trustee). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Con-
strained Prudent-Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987).
It has been suggested that the prudent-person rule should further be expanded to
allow "non-traditional" investments based on political or social goals. Leslie J. Bobo, Com-
ment, Non-Traditional Investments of Fiduciaries: Re-examining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33
EMORY UJ. 1067 (1984).
88 Pierre LePaulle, An Outsider's Viespoint of the Nature of Trusts, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 52,
61 (1928).
89 Thurman Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L REV. 800, 823
(1931).
90 The illusive nature of the fiduciary obligation has led to some difficulties in cap-
turing its definition. J.C. SHEPHERD, LAW OF FIDUCIAIES 3-5 (1951); Arthur J. Jacobson,
Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries, 3 CARDoZO L. REv. 519 (1982).
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reason "[t]he word fiduciary (which earlier had received very little
judicial support)91 was adopted to describe these situations which
fell short of the now strictly-defined trust. 2 By application of
fiduciary principles, a court could stop injustice or set aside trans-
actions that were unfair or inequitable." For example, the "con-
structive trust" was created to address wrongdoing and unfairness
in the disposal of property acquired through the breach of a fidu-
ciary duty. 4
Similarly, "purchase money resulting trusts" were used to pro-
tect a party that paid for property but allowed title to be taken in
the name of another person.95 The. doctrines of constructive and
resulting trusts were developed essentially to do equity.' As Dean
Pound observed, the constructive trust is a purely remedial institu-
tion.9'
91 An early example of the use of the term fiduciary is in Bishop of Winchester v.
Knight, 1 P. Wms. 406, 407 (1717), noted in L.S. Sealy, Fiduciay Relationships, 1962 CAM-
BRIDGE LJ. 69, 72 n.11.
92 Sealy, supra note 91, at 71-72 (footnote omitted). Equity courts "carefully refrained
from setting bounds to the principles which control those in fiduciary capacities. By re-
taining this elasticity, the chancellors were able to extend their reach to all devices in-
vented by unfaithful fiduciaries." Comment, The Duty of Loyalty of a Trustee, 8 OHio ST.
LJ. 75 (1941) (footnote omitted).
93 One author has stated that, "'Fiduciary responsibility' is something of a half-way
house between a legal requirement and an ethical standard." A.A. Sommer, For-Word.
Fiduciay Duties-The Search for Content, 9 LOY. U. Cm. LJ. 525, 531 (1978).
94 ScoTr & FRATcHER, supra note 68, § 495; see also D.W. Fox, Constructive Trusts in
a Company Setting, 1986 J. Bus. L. 23 (general discussion of constructive trusts); Construc-
tive Trusts, 38 LAw TIMEs 212 (1893-94) (discussion of how a person may become a con-
structive trustee); Jacob L Keiden, Comment, Equil -Construcive Trusts-Thieves and Em-
bszlers as Constructive Trustees, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 798, 800 (1937) (constructive trusts per-
mit the profits of the wrongdoer to be recovered); Lucian Morehead, Comment, Construc-
tive Trust as a Remedy for Fraud, 14 TEX. L. REV. 252 (1936) (discussing constructive
trusts).
A Uniform Fiduciaries Act sought to establish rules to determine whether a person
had sufficient notice to make him a constructive trustee. Note, Legislation-The Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (1933); Alwine L. Mulhearn, Comment, Good Faith
in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 9 TUL L. REV. 618 (1935).
95 J. Glenn Edwards & M.T. Van Hecke, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in North
Carolina, 9 N.C. L. REV. 177, 178 (1930).
96 George P. Costigen, The Classification of Trusts as Expressed, Resulting and Con-
structiv4 27 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1914); see also Edwards & Van Hecke, supra note 95, at
178 ("[Allthough it has produced much litigation and perhaps some perjury, the [pur-
chase money resulting trust] device seems to have worked fairly well.").
97 Roscoe Pound, The Progress of Law, 1918-19. Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 421
(1919-20). See generally Note, Resulting and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky, 20 KY. L.J. 383-
394 (1931-32).
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Fiduciary duties have also been applied to "confidential rela-
tions" in which there is an inequality of business intelligence or
dependence.9" In early equity, for example, a breach of confi-
dence could be found where an individual was dependent on the
fiduciary's advice because the fiduciary was a professional adviser,
an expert, or had greater knowledge about the subject matter.9
Today, fiduciaries who use confidential information may be held
liable for the profits from such activities."° The definition of
what constitutes a confidential relationship that is subject to such
fiduciary duties is somewhat uncertain. 1 ' At the least, some in-
equality of the parties may be required.1
2
The law of fiduciary duties continues to retain its elasticity. As
one author notes, "The twentieth century is witnessing an un-
precedented expansion and development of the fiduciary law."0"
98 George C. Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 237, 240 (1928); see also Peed v. Peed, 325 S.E.2d 275, 282 (N.C. CL App.)
(constructive trusts often involve a violation or abuse of a confidential relationship), cert.
denied, 330 S.E.2d 612 (N.C. 1985).
Breach of confidence was one of the traditional areas of concern for Chancery
courts. See, e.g., F.W. MArTLAND, EQUnTY (2d ed. 1936), quoted in Sealy, supra note 91, at
69 (lhese three give place in court of conscience, Fraud, accident and breach of confi-
dence.").
99 Sealy, supra note 91. Initially, liability for a breach of fiduciary duty in a confiden-
tial relationship turned on whether there was fraud, undue influence or other abuse of
the confidence. SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 68, § 2.5. One author has stated that the
status of a confidential relationship may be in the process of being converted into a
higher degree of fiduciary relationship, as has occurred in the case of doctors and pa-
tients. Frankel, supra note 50, at 796.
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958); Peter Birks, The Remedies
for Abuse of Confidential Information, 1990 LLOYDS MAR. & COM. L.Q. 460; Richard D.
Worrell et al., Note, Imposition of a Constructive Trust in New England, 41 B.U. L. REV. 78,
83 (1961).
If a confidential relationship is found to exist then "the utmost good faith and
frankness must characterize all transactions between the parties." George W. McQuain,
Note, Equit-Fiduciay or Confuential Relations-What Constitutes, 39 W. VA. L.Q. 52, 52
(1932).
101 In United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. CL 1759 (1992), the Second Circuit stated that, "Reposing confidential informa-
tion in another . . . does not by itself create a fiduciary relationship." Id. at 568.
102 Bogert, supra note 98, at 240. Bogert notes that Professor Pomeroy had stated
that Chancery refused to define the term confidential relations "in order to preserve for
itself complete liberty of action." Id. at 237 (quoting JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE § 956 (4th ed. 1918)).
103 Frankel, supra note 50, at 796. One author has stated that, "Foreign jurists are
amazed and foreign publicists somewhat perplexed at the widespread application of the
trust concept . . . and at our universal reliance on the trust and readiness to project it




This has included determinations that doctors °  and union lead-
ers are fiduciaries; °5 and one author has advocated that fiducia-
ry principles be used to govern relations among parent and
child."t The rules of professional responsibility for lawyers are
based upon fiduciary principles. 07 It has also been suggested
that fiduciary duties should be imposed on businesses to protect
workers who are displaced by layoffs or plant closings,' and on
investors and businesses to impose social responsibility."° In ad-
dition, efforts are under way to impose fiduciary duties on banks
for the protection of their depositors and borrowers. 0 Fiduciary
duties have even been applied to criminalize activities by govern-
ment officials who seek to profit from their office.'
104 Frankel, supra note 50, at 796.
105 Id.; see also House v. Schwartz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 308, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (officers of
labor union are fiduciaries of assets of the union).
106 Connie K. Beck et al., Comment, The Rights of Children. A Trust Model, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 669 (1978); Mark E. Swindle, Comment, Tyra v. Woodson: Breach of a
Fiduciary Relationship and the Constructive Trust, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 91 (1974). Trust devices
have also been used to apportion matrimonial or "palimony" property. Brian H. Davis,
Implied Resulting or Constructive Trusts? 1989 DENNING L.J. 52. But see United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (fiduciary duties do not arise simply
by reason of family relationships, including matrimonial relations).
107 Gary A. Munneke & Theresa E. Loscalzo, The Lauyer's Duty to Keep Clients Informed:
Establishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391, 398
(1989). For a discussion of the fiduciary role of lawyers, see Andrew L. Willms Lauyers as
Fiduciaries, Wis. B. BULL., Dec. 1987, at 15.
Little has been written about the origin of the fiduciary duties of lawyers. See Lester
Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary
Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 154 n.19 (1988).
108 Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L REV. 1189 (1991).
109 See generally BEVIS LONGSrRErH & H. DAVID ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RE-
SPONSIBILTY AND THE INSTITTIONAL INVESTOR (1973). Fiduciary duties are the subject of
an article on their role in strategic delays in various commercial situations. Saul Levmore,
Strategic Delays and Fiduciary Duties, 74 VA. L. REV. 863 (1988).
One author stated that fiduciary relations form "the most rudimentary instance of
association. More complex associations are built upon the fiduciary relation by successive
modifications of its elemental structure. The structure of the fiduciary relation may be
described as shifting judgment from one person to another." Arthur J. Jacobson, The
Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 599, 615 (1980)
110 Curtis, supra note 47.
Banks already have fiduciary duties in other aspects of their operations. See generally
Walter Wyatt, Fiduciary Powers of National Banks, 6 VA. L. REV. 301 (1920). Credit union
officials may also have fiduciary duties. Sharyn G. Campbell & Kathryn A. Black, Emerging
Doctrines of Fiduciary Responsibility of Credit Union Officials, 40 Bus. LAW. 957 (1985).
111 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 117, 142-48 -(1981) (discussing prosecution of Governors Otto Kerner,
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The fiduciary concept also became "a critical building block"
in the law of agency, partnerships, and business organizations.
11 2
The making of agents into fiduciaries for the benefit of their
principals seems to have appeared at the end of the eighteenth
century. 13 Partners were also deemed to be fiduciaries. Oddly, a
partner is both a trustee and a cestui que trust. As a trustee, each
partner must protect the interests of the partnership for the other
partners. As a beneficiary, each partner is protected by the con-
comitant fiduciary duties of other partners."' Fiduciary duties
have also been applied to corporate officers and directors.
11 5
D. Corporations and Fiduciary Duties
The application of fiduciary duties to corporations originated
in the Anglo-American business sector in the seventeenth
century.1 16 In England, in 1742, Lord Hardwicke concluded that
the committeemen forming the management of a corporation
were acting as agents "to those who employ them in this
.trust."" 7 It was not until this century, however, that those duties
were extended to majority shareholders in the United States." 8
The fiduciary concept was applied to corporations to fill a
perceived gap in the law.1 9 The separation of ownership from
Marvin Mandell and others).
112 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decision Making-Some Theoretical
Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985).
113 Frankel, supra note 50. Where an individual has been entrusted to perform a
particular job, he must act consistently with that undertaking. Sealy, supra note 91, at 76.
114 Sealy, supra note 91, at 76; see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 67, § 36. For a
general discussion of fiduciary duties of partners inter se, see Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394
F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Cir. 1975), afld, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
908 (1977).
Section 21 of the Uniform Partnership Act makes every partner a trustee of profits
of the firm for other partners. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND BusiNEss Asso-
CriTIONS: STATUTES, RuLES AND FORMs § 21 (1991 ed.). The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act contains an "integrated and exclusive statement of the fiduciary duties of partners."
Id. It requires a duty of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty. Weidner, supra note 47, at
457-58.
115 Scott, supra note 48.
116 Frankel, supra note 50, at 795 n.3.
117 Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405 (1742), noted in Sealy, supra note 91,
at 70.
118 Frankel, supra note 50, at 795-906. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483
(1919), the Supreme Court concluded that fiduciary obligations exist between majority
and minority shareholders. For a discussion of the fiduciary duties of a majority share-
holder, see William W. Yerrall, The Extent to Which a Stockholder, as Such, is a Fiduciary in
Massachusetts, 16 MASS. L.Q. 57 (1931). See generally L. Clark Hicks, Jr., Comment, Recent
Decisions 60 Miss. LJ. 425, 426-28 (1990).
119 Kansas held as early as 1879 that directors of corporations act like trustees. Ed-
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control created a need for the protection of shareholders from
overreaching by management.12 ° As one author notes, managers
were naturally inclined to maximize their own wealth rather than
shareholders.
21
There was, therefore, a perceived need for shareholder pro-
tection from the vagaries of management. "Courts and legislatures
have met this need by treating management, directors, and con-
trolling shareholders as 'fiduciaries' who owe certain legally
enforcible duties to the firm.' 22 "The corporation is a human
ward J. Nazar, Comment, Corporations: A Strict Fiduciary Standard for Officers and Directors,
16 WASHBURN LJ. 755 (1963). As trustees, directors were sometimes held liable for taking
corporate opportunities or for engaging in a competing business. See generaly Note, Liabil-
ity of Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Corporate Facilities, or Engaging in a
Competing Business, 39 CoLtum. L REV. 219 (1939).
The introduction of trust concepts into corporate law may have been accelerated by
the introduction of so-called business trusts, such as the one organized by Standard Oil
Company in the previous century. These were simply business combinations of separate
corporate shareholders who transferred their stocks to trustees, allowing them, in effect,
to merge their operations into a single combine. S.C.T. Dodd, The Present Legal Status of
Trusts, 7 HARV. L REV. 157 (1893). These trusts became the subject of abuse and were
met with the antitrust laws. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE (1990). For a discussion of busi-
ness trusts and the application of fiduciary principles to their operations, see Robert S.
Stevens, Limited Liability in Business Trusts, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 116 (1922); Wilgus, supra note
47.
The device known as a "Massachusetts Trust" also grew rapidly in popularity earlier
in this century. Scott, supra note 52. This device later became less popular as state corpo-
rate securities laws became more flexible in their operation. See generally LARRY
SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., CORPORATIONS 23-24 (3d ed. 1986).
120 In 1905, the President of the New York Stock Exchange stated that:
'The extension of the principle of incorporation has enabled leaders in business
to set up two standards of morality, to maintain a Jekyll and Hyde duality, and
to do as members of an impersonal and non-moral corporate body acts which
they would shrink from as individuals. In private life they are stainless, but in
the interests of corporations . . . they will have recourse to every villainy
damned in the decalogue."
Wilgus, supra note 47, at 72 (quoting Chandler, Express Trusts, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 7,
1905, at 20).
121 David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate
Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 184, 235 (1979).
122 Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Gover-
nance Project, 35 STAN. L REV. 927 (1983). Under state corporate law, the business and
affairs of corporations are managed by the boards of directors. A limitation on their
authority is a fiduciary duty to the corporation and the shareholders. See Patrick J. Ryan,
Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Compliance Obligation in Section
2.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governancej 66 WASH. L. REV.
413, 442-443 (1991); see also Christu K.M. Dela Garza, Conjlict of Interest Transactions: Fidu-
ciaiy Duties of Corporate Directors Who Are Also Controlling Shareholders, 57 DENY. L J. 609,
610 (1980) ("[T]he Uniform Fiduciaries Act defines a fiduciary as both a trustee of an
express trust and a director or officer of a corporation.").
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enterprise, subject to human failings, and the goal of the law has
been to prevent, correct, or rectify those failings when necessary.
The bulk of these adjudicative mechanisms come under the gener-
al heading of fiduciary duty."12 The law thus chose a middle
course to deal with the inherent conflict between management
and shareholders, using the flexibility of the fiduciary duty doc-
trine to steer around the shoals. 24
A critical benchmark in the application of fiduciary duties in
the context of commercial operations came in the New York case
of Meinhard v. Salmon.1 5 There, Judge Cardozo, speaking for the
court, held that a breach of fiduciary duty occurs where a joint
venturer renewed and expanded an expiring lease without includ-
ing his co-venturer. 26 That decision, however, was rendered by a
sharply divided court (4-3), and leading commentators suggested
that the rule would not be followed for corporate directors be-
123 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Coporations, 138 U. PA.
L Rxv. 1675, 1675 (1990).
124 Phillips, supra note 121, at 255.
125 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
126 In words that have frequently been quoted by courts in applying fiduciary duties
to corporations and other business entities, Judge Cordozo stated:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when peti-
tioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion"
of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be
lowered by any judgement of this court.
Id. at 546 (citation omitted). Earlier, the New York courts had held that a corporate
agent may not compete with his principal. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122
N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1919) (employee who had been sent to investigate property in which the
corporation held an option breached a fiduciary duty by acquiring claims on adjoining
property).
In Wendt v. Fisher, 154 N.E. 303 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1926), Judge Cardozo had also
held that the duty of loyalty of fiduciaries in a commercial context is uncompromising.
He stated that where the duty of loyalty was breached the law would not look to deter-
mine whether the contract was fair or unfair. If there are dual interests to be served, full
disclosure must be made. If not, the party being represented by the fiduciary may have
the transaction set aside without any inquiry as to whether the transaction was fair or
unfair. "Only by this uncompromising rigidity has the rule of undivided loyalty been
maintained against disintegrating erosion." Id. at 304. In Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas
& Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918), Judge Cardozo further stated that the fiduciary




cause "the policy of facilitating business has prevailed over the
older policy of removal of temptation."1 27 Consequently, a lesser
standard of care may be applied to the fiduciary duties of a board
of directors under corporate law than activities under general trust
law.'
28
Nevertheless, the Meinhard decision signaled a continued ef-
fort to extend the fiduciary concept into corporate law.129 For
example, in Pepper v. Litton,3' the Supreme Court stated that di-
rectors and controlling shareholders are fiduciaries, and that their
"dealings with the corporation are subject to rigorous scruti-
ny ... " Moreover, "[t]heir powers are powers in trust .... [the]
fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire
community of interests in the corporation--creditors as well as
shareholders."
127 Scott, supra note 48, at 555 n.30.
128 Antonia M. Graumbach & W.B. McKeown, Fiduciay Responsibilities of Private Founda-
tion Boards, 125 TR. & EST. 37 (1986). See infra note 139 and accompanying text. The
concept of fiduciary duties for corporate officers and directors had begun to loosen be-
fore the decision in Meinhard. At an early point, there was a principle that absolutely
precluded contracts between a corporation and its directors. This appeared to be the law
in 1880. -Thirty years later this principle was dead." Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trust-
ees?, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 39 (1966).
In the 1930s, after Meinhard, a famous academic debate began on the role of cor-
porate management and their obligations to shareholders. It was then observed that the
dispersal of stock holdings in publicly held corporations was separating management con-
trol from ownership. See generally A.A. BERTE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); A-A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers in
Trust 31 HARv. L REV. 1049 (1931); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1932); Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper
Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong Question, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 425 (1990); E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); E.
Meriick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practi-
cable? 2 U. CHI. L REV. 194 (1935). This debate has yet to end. In 1966, for example,
Professor Brudney observed there is a lack of identity between the economic interests of
those who control corporations while owning only a portion, or none, of the equity and
the economic interests of the owners of the equity. Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Idealogy in
Transactions Affecting Corporate Contro4 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 260 (1966). More recently,
this debate has centered on whether independent directors should be added to the
board of directors. See generally Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Vilage?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona,
Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L REV. 273, 283-84 (1991).
129 The expansion of fiduciary duties into commercial realms has also been occurring
in other countries. Dennis R. KIinck, The Rise of the "Remedial" Fiduciary Relationship: A
Comment on International Coma Resources, Ltd. v. Lac Minerals, Ltd., 33 MCGILL LJ.
599, 601 (1988).
130 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
131 Id. at 306-07. The scope of fiduciary duties owed by directors to creditors is today
quite limited. See infra note 142. See generally David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders Rights and
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By 1980, as Professor Coffee points out,13 2 the courts had
held that fiduciary duties of stockholders/directors under state law
prohibited them from using their offices for personal benefit at
the expense of other shareholders;'33 that majority shareholders
who attempted to "freezeout" minority shareholders were subject
to fiduciary duties;"' that shareholders of a close corporation
owed fiduciary duties to other shareholders;13 5 and that fiduciary
duties of corporate officers prohibited them from using inside
information to profit in their own personal trading activities.
1 6
In addition, directors and officers were precluded by reason
of their fiduciary role from appropriating an opportunity that
rightfully belonged to. the corporation. 37  Fiduciary standards
the Case For a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1023 (1991); William Klein, Equity v.
Debt: Trying to Level The Corporate Money Field, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 19, 1992, at 1.
132 Coffee, supra note 111, at 117 n.2.
133 The obligations of a corporate director fall into two broad categories: a duty of
loyalty and a duty of care." Jonathon W. Groessl, Note, Delaware'r New Section 102(b)(7):
Boon or Bane for Corporate Directors? 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 411, 441 (1988); Norwood P.
Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care. Riddles Wiedy Expounded, 24 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 923 (1990). See generally Zahn v. TransAmerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 45 (3d Cir.
1947).
134 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-78 (Del. 1977). For a discussion of
the duties of majority shareholders to minority interests, see Gerald Gillerman, The Corpo-
rate Fiduciary Under State Law, 3 CoRP. L. REv. 299 (1980). For a discussion of sharehold-
er voting trusts and whether they implicate trust law principles, see generally Turner V.
Adams, Note, Corporations-Voting Trust-Should Trust Principles Apply to Close Corporations?,
48 N.C. L. REV. 336, 342 (1970).
The Supreme Court has also held that a stockholder bringing a derivative action on
behalf of a corporation is a fiduciary representing the interests of other shareholders.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
135 A Massachusetts court field that the members of a close corporation owed fiducia-
ry duties essentially equal to that of partners in a partnership. The court stated that this
strict good faith standard is more stringent than the standard of fiduciary duty to which
directors and stockholders of other corporations must adhere. Donahue v. Rodd Electro-
type Co. 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975). See generally Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Comment, The Standard of Fiduciary Duty in a Close Corporation
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 61 IowA L. REv. 876 (1976).
136 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 910-12 (N.Y. 1969). The decision in Dia-
mond v. Oreamuno was, however, later rejected by at least two other courts. In Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub non, Leahman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S.
386 (1974), petition for cert. filed; 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975), the Second Circuit had con-
cluded that the Florida courts would adopt the Diamond v. Oreamuno standard. The Su-
preme Court, however, vacated that decision and directed that the issue be certified to
the Florida Supreme Court for decision. The Florida court rejected the Diamond standard.
The Florida court's decision was followed in Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
1978) (diversity action applying Indiana law).
137 Jodi L. Popofsky, Note, Corporate Opportunity and Corporate Competition: A Double-Bar-
reled Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 10 HOFSRA L. REV. 1193 (1982). This theory is best
exemplified by Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). There the president and di-
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were also often codified in state business corporation laws.lm
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBC'), howev-
er, did not .use the term fiduciary duty because the draftsmen
were concerned that the concept was being confused with the law
of trusts. It was thought that some of the duties imposed on trust-
ees are not appropriate for directors. 3 9 Instead, the RMBCA es-
tablishes a duty of good faith and requires the care that an ordi-
narily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances. This in essence is designed to define the
fiduciary duties of a director without labeling them as such.
The approach taken by the RMBGA was a reflection of the
erosion and resistance to the expansion of these fiduciary du-
ties.' In the 1960s, prior to the approval of the RMBGA, Pro-
fessor William Gary charged that the Delaware courts had "contrib-
uted to shrinking the concept of fiduciary responsibility and fair-
ness, and indeed have followed the lead of the Delaware legisla-
ture in watering down shareholders' rights."' Delaware and
other states also began allowing corporations to limit the liability
of corporate directors for fiduciary violations.
1 42
The application of fiduciary duties in a corporate context has
not been abandoned in Delaware. Before and after Professor
Gary's criticisms, the Delaware courts held that a basic principle of
rector of Loft, Inc. was found to have used his position and assets of the company to re-
vitalize the failing Pepsi-Cola Company for his own personal benefit. Thereafter, however,
the legislatures began a process of allowing corporate opportunities to be acquired where
there is full disclosure and independent director approval. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 144 (1974); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.62 (1985).
138 J. Kennetli Moritz, Note, Toward Standards for Managers Subject to Hostile Bids: The
Ti-Level Mode; 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 269, 273 (1988).
139 REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION Acr § 8.30 commentary at 222 (1985).
140 One author has stated that:
The original analogy between a trustee and those who control a corporation was
a close one. But as corporations began to play a role of increasing importance
in an increasingly complex commercial world, the strictures imposed by the law
on a true trustee gradually eroded. Today little is left but the basic notion that
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders owe some sort of duty, one that
will be enforced by the court, to the corporation, and through it to the share-
holders.
LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL, CORPORATIONS 545 (1982).
141 William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE Lj.
663 (1974), noted in Bartley A. Brennan, Current Developments Surrounding the Business judg-
ment Rule: A "Race to the Bottom" Theoy of Corporate Law Revived, 12 WHrrrIER L REV. 299,
303 (1991):
142 Douglas M. Branson, Assault On Another Citadek Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary
Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 380-81 (1988).
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Delaware corporate law is that directors have a fiduciary duty to
act in the best interests of the corporation's shareholders.1 43 Its
scope and application, however, seem to depend on the prevailing
winds of a judiciary that often and unpredictably changes course
as new issues arise. This became most apparent during the take-
over mania of the 1980s.'" The fiduciary duty principle allowed
the Delaware courts effectively to superimpose themselves over the
board of directors of Delaware corporations during the many take-
overs that occurred during this period. In that role, the Delaware
courts reviewed acquisitions for such things as fairness to minority
stockholders,145and they sought to impose judicial due process
type decisionmaking procedures on boards of directors in consid-
ering proposals to buy out companies and in reacting to such
proposals. 146  Those efforts were often conflicting,147  and they
143 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
144 For a discussion of the problem raised by fiduciary duties analysis in the context
of mergers and acquisitions, see e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders v. Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1986); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE UJ. 698 (1982);
Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice: A Reexamination of Director's Fiduciary Duties in the Context of
Hostile Acquisitions, 15 DEL J. CORP. L. 811 (1990); Felicia Smith, Recognition of the Fiducia-
y Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers Defending Against Change of Control by Tender Offer,
7 MIss. C. L. REv. 117 (1987); Note, The Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in
Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE LJ. 1238 (1979). See also Rob-
ert L Bevan, Fiduciaries Face Complex Demands when Corporate Takeovers Occur, 125 TR. &
EsT. 42 (1986) (discussion of how a bank trust department should handle tender offers);
Daniel M. Snow, Note, Bank Financing of Involuntary Take-Overs of Corporate Customers: A
Breach of a Fiduciary Duty?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827 (1978) (discussion of claims that
banks have fiduciary duties in financing competing interests in tender offers); Comment,
Disclosure of Confidential Information-A Commercial Bank Has No Fiduciary Duty to Refrain
from Financing a Takeover of a Borrower Nor Is It Precluded from Using Such Information from
One Borrower to Evaluate a Loan to Another-Washington Steel Corp. v. T.W. Corp., 14 GA.
L. REV. 116 (1979).
Duties of pension funds trustees under ERISA may also come into conflict with the
interest of companies to have their pension funds serve as a foil for tender offers. See
infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text; Ann Myre, Note, Fidudary Duties of Pension
Fund Managers In Corporate Take-overs, 11 N. KY. L REV. 553 (1984).
Fiduciary duty issues have also been raised in connection with going private transac-
tions. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 87
YALE L.J. 1354, 1365-70 (1978). See generally Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, Claims of Aiding
and Abetting a Directors Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Does Everyone Who Deals with a Delaware
Director Owe Fiduciary Duties to that Director's Shareholders, 15 DEL J. CORr. L. 943 (1990).
145 For a discussion of the evolution of fiduciary duties in the Delaware courts, see
Charles W. Murdock, Delaware: The Race to the Bottom-Is an End in Sight?, 9 LOY. U. CHI.
LJ. 643 (1978).
146 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally William F. Johnson,
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"triggered a sharp debate."14 s The result was confusion and a
less than complete understanding of what is expected of corporate
managers.
E. Federal Laws and Fiduciary Duties
1. ERISA
Fiduciary duties have also found their way into federal law.
The most visible of those incursions is found in ERISA, which
imposes broad fiduciary duties on the administrators of retirement
plans' that now hold trillions of dollars in assets. 5° The in-
tent of ERISA was "to incorporate and federalize the common law
of trusts as appropriate in view of the special nature and purposes
of employee benefit plans.""' The standards for administrators
established by the federal government under ERISA have often
Note, Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.: Corporate Auctions Now Require Sharper Super-
vision by Directors, 39 AM. U. L REv. 721 (1990).
The Delaware courts and others also strongly suggested that the use of outside
directors may better assure that corporate management is meeting its fiduciary duties. See
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household
Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985); Solash v. Telex Corp. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 93,608 (Del. Ch. 1988); supra note 145. For a discussion of the increased role of out-
side directors in management, see generally Arthur W. Hahn & Carol B. Manzoni, The
Monitoring Committee and Outside Directors' Evolving Duty of Care, 9 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 587
(1978).
147 Compare Smith, 488 A.2d at 858 and Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 with Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
148 Tamar Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's Project
on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705, 705 (1984); A.A. Sommer, Jr., The
Duty of Loyalty in the ALl's Corporate Governance Projec 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 719 (1984);
see also Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Invetment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. LQ.
497 (1992) (discussion of need to apply fiduciary duties to investment bankers in merger
transactions).
149 Under ERISA a party is considered a fiduciary if it uses discretion in administer-
ing a benefits plan, controlling its assets, or providing investment advice to the plan.
William L Scogland, Fiduciary Duty: What Does it Mean?, 24 TORT & INS. UJ. 803 (1988-
89); see also Scott A. Cammar, Note, Interpreting ERTSA: Corporate Officer Liability for Delin-
quent Contributions, 1986 DUKE L.J. 710, 724-25 (the definition of a fiduciary under ERISA
is very broad and may include any corporate officer who exercises authority or discretion-
ary control over a plan's management, assets or administration).
150 O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 62, at 25-39.
ERISA was adopted by Congress in recognition of the fact that pension plans were
holding substantial wealth and that many members of the public were dependent on
their pension schemes for retirement. Myre, supra note 144.
151 Monica Gallagher, Recent Developments and Concepts Relating to Fiduciary Liability, 16
FORUM 753 (1964).
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been confusing, but they have also sometimes been more flexible
than traditional trust standards.5 2 For example, the Department
of Labor has adopted prudential investment standards that recog-
nize modem portfolio investment theory.'" The ERISA concept
of fiduciary duties, however, continues to raise the following, diffi-
cult issues for benefit plan administrators: Should administrators
participate in the management of companies in which the plan
holds stock?54 Should they seek to have their companies act in
a socially responsible manner?'55
152 For a discussion of fiduciary standards under ERISA, see generally Daniel C.
Knickerbockers, Jr., Trust Law with a Difference: An Overview of ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility,
23 REAL PROP. PRoBs. & TR. J. 633 (1988); Scogland, supra note 149; Bill Shaw et al., In-
vestment Prudence and Fiduciary Responsibility in Managing Defined Benefit Pension Funds Under
ERISA, 22 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 83 (1988); Leslie L. Wellman & Shari J. Clark, An Over-
view of Pension Benefit and Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 665
(1990); Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA:
An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Tes4 71 CORNELL L. REV. 986 (1986); Note,
Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Ac of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1975); Deborah A. Geier, Note, ERISA: Punitive Dam-
ages for a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743 (1985); Judy B. Shepura,
Note, Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: Interpretations Within the Eleventh Circui 19 CUMB. L.
REV. 131 (1988); Donald J. Weiss, Note, Conflicts of Interest Arising Under ERISA's Fiduciary
Standards: Can the Trustee Ever Be Prudent As Long As He Faces Dual Loyalties?, 9 NOVA L.J.
413, (1985).
153 For a discussion of the prudent-person rule under ERISA, see James D.
Hutchinson, The Federal Prudent-Man Rule Under ERISA, 22 VILL L. REV. 15 (1976-77);
Morton Klevan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA'S Prudent-Man Rule: WIhat are the Guide
Posts?, 44 J. TAx'N. 152 (1976); H. Stenris Little & Larry T. Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under
ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1977); Timothy R. Garmager, Note,
Economic Analysis and the Prudent-Man Rule Under ERISA: Efficiency Versus the Public Interest, 7
Loy. U. CHI. I.J. 683 (1976).
The Department of Labor's regulations under ERISA "reflect most dramatically the
influence of portfolio theory because they specifically state that the prudence of an in-
vestment decision should not be judged without regard to the role that the proposed
investment or investment course of action plays within the overall portfolio." Bevis
Longstreth, Fiduciaries, Capital Markets and Regulation: The Current Challenge, 7 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 237, 239-40 (1988).
154 See generally Jayne W. Baruard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Gover-
nance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135 (1991); Richard W. Stevenson, Large Foot in Board-Room Door
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at DI; James A. White, Giant California Pension Fund Softens
Approach to Influencing Corporations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at C9; James A. White, New
York's Regan to Pensions: Hands Off, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at Cl.
The role to be played by plan administrators is not a mere academic issue. By
1988, it was "statistically apparent that institutional trustee shareholders control corporate
America." Robert A.G. Monks, Introduction To Pension and Trust Fiduciaries: Risks and Duties
as Corporate Shareholders, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 223 (1988). In fact, benefit schemes
regulated by ERISA are the dominant owners of American industrial firms. Id at 227. See
generally O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 62.
155 See generally Eugene Maloney, Proxy Voting Responsibility Under ERISA, 7 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 259, 262-63 (1988).
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2. The Federal Securities Laws
The federal securities laws have also raised the specter of
fiduciary duties. A House committee report published in connec-
tion with the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
equated fiduciary duties of market participants with a "guarantee
of 'straight shooting.'"'156 The courts also seemed willing to find
such duties to be implicit in those acts. For example, in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Cheneiy Corp.,157 Justice Frankfurter
stated that officers and directors of holding companies undergoing
reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935"' "occupy positions of trust."5' The Court rejected "a lax
view of fiduciary, obligations," but it noted that identifying the
scope and nature of fiduciary duties raised a number of questions:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he
failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the conse-
quences of his deviation from duty?"W
156 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
157 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
158 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988).
159 Chene7y, 318 U.s. at 85.
160 Id. at 85-86. An early problem raising fiduciary duty issues in the securities mar-
kets involved agreements under which an indenture trustee, such as a bank or other
financial institution, was named as a party for enforcing bond holder rights under the
indenture agreement. For a discussion of the trust indenture, see generally Louis S;
Posner, Liabity of the Trustee Under the Corporate Indenture 42 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1928);
Louis S. Posner, The Trustee and the Trust Indenture: A Further Study, 46 YALE LJ. 737
(1937). See also Richard B. Smith et al., The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 Needs No Conflict of
Intert eio 35 Bus. LAw. 161, 163-64 (1979) (description of the history of corporate
indenture agreements). Such indenture transactions date back to at least 1830, but they
did not receive notoriety until the stock market crash in 1929, which resulted in numer-
ous corporate reorganizations where the rights of bond holders were often abused or left
unprotected by indenture trustees. Those "trustees" were often affiliated with management
in the company being reorganized, and they expressed the view that their duties where
chiefly ministerial. Se generally SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE .WORK ACfnvrlEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COmMIrrEs (1936-40); Albert R. Jones, The Corporate Trustee Proben 26
KY. U. 3 (1937).
Initially, the courts took different views on the scope of indenture trustees' fiduciary
duties. Smith, supra, at 164. But concerns with conflicts increased as a result of the stock
market crash of 1929 and because of the massive growth of debentures. Indeed, by 1931,
over 10 billion dollars in bond issues were being handled by bank trustees under bond
indentures. Shinn, supra note 58, at 359 n.1. A massive study conducted by the SEC also
revealed abuses. SECURITIES & EXCH.COMM'N, supra. That study resulted in the enactment
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The creation of private rights of action under rule lOb-5161
and its expansive application also "helped fill the gap in the law
left by the erosion of state law [of fiduciary] duties."" 2 In addi-
tion, the SEC asserted that the securities laws created a new feder-
al corporation law with fiduciary duties greater than those imposed
by state law." The SEC sought an expansive application of such
duties, and it was aided in that effort by the courts.'6 For exam-
ple, in Rosenfeld v. Black,"' the Second Circuit held that fiduciary
principles precluded an investment adviser to a mutual fund from
selling its position to another adviser.16
of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, which imposed limited fiduciary duties on indenture
trustees. For a discussion of the history and background of that act, see John P. Camp-
bell & Robert Zack, Put a Bullet in the Poor Beast. His Leg is Broken and His Use has Passed.
Conflict of Interest in the Dual Role of Lender and Corporate Indenture Trustem a Proposal to End
it in the Public Interest 32 Bus. LAW. 1705 (1977); Michael V. Campbell, Implications of the
Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990: Breathing New ife into the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 11
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 181 (1992); Henry F. Johnson, The Forgotten' Securities Statute: Prob-
lems in the Trust Indenture Act, 13 U. TOL. L REV. 92 (1981); William A. Johnson, Default
Administration of Corporate Trust Indentures: The General Nature of the Trustee's Responsibility
and Events of Default, 15 ST. Louis U. L.J. 203 (1970); Wilker G. Katz, Responsibility of
Trustees Under the Federal Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 26 A.B.A. J. 290 (1940); H.C.
McCollom, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Trustees, 36 COL. L REV.
1197 (1936); Robert G. Miller, Legislation: The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 25 CORNELL
L.Q. 105 (1939-40); Stewart M. Robertson, The Venture Holders and the Indenture Trustee:
Controlling Managerial Discretion in the Solvent Enterp7ise 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461,
472-77 (1988); Frederica R. Olorzut, Note, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939: The Corporate
Trustee as Creditor, 24 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1976).
161 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
162 Robert S. Schwartz, Note, SEC Rule lob-5: Constructive Fraud in the Liabilities of
Fiduciaries, 35 OHIO ST. LJ. 934 (1974).
163 Id. (citing Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
164 The SEC has also broadened the fiduciary duties applied to broker/dealers under
the federal securities laws by establishing the so-called "shingle" theory. This theory sug-
gests that a broker is a professional who hangs out his or her shingle and makes an im-
plied representation to the public that they will be dealt with fairly by the professional.
Carl Wartman, Note, Broker Dealers, Market Makers and Fiduciary Duties, 9 LoY. U. CHI. L.
746, 747 (1978).
165 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 802 (1972).
166 The Second Circuit was not creating new law, as evidenced by an old English
opinion:
This is a very extraordinary case .... I do not remember a case where
the office of a trustee has been purchased for money .... [Ilt is a well-settled
principle that, if a trustee makes a profit of his trusteeship, it shall inure to the
benefit of his ceatui qui trusts. Though there is some peculiarity in the case,
there does not seem to be any difference in principle whether the trustee de-
rived the profit by means of the trust property, or from the office itself. I shall




• In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 6
the Supreme Court seemed to lend further credence to the SEC's
views. The Court stated that a "controlling stockholder owes the
corporation a fiduciary obligation-one 'designed for the protec-
tion of the entire community of interests in the corpora-
tion--creditors as well as stockholders.'"'" In that opinion, Jus-
tice Douglas quoted from the legislative history of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: "' [Dlisregard of trust relationships by those
whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seam-
less web' along with manipulation, investor's ignorance, and the
like."' 9 He also stated, however, that Congress did not intend
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934170 to serve
Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Giss. 192, 193-94, 65 Eng. Rep. 620, 621 (1856). But see
SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.) (permitting sale of advisory relation-
ship), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958); Krieger v. Anderson, 182 A.2d 907 (Del. 1962)
(allowing sale of advisory relationship). See generally Note, Advisoy Succession in the Mutual
Fund Industry, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 278 (1972); Harold Schiffman, Note, The Relationship
Between the Investment Advisor and the Mutual Fund: Too Close for Comfort, 45 FORDHAM L
REV. 184 (1976); A. Ross Wollen, Note, Mutual Fund Control-Transfer Profits: Congress, the
SEC, and Rosenfeld v. Black, 58 VA. L. REV. 371 (1972). For a discussion of the fiduciary
duties of investment advisers, see Allan M. Ahart, Advising the Individual Investor. Compar-
ing the Federal Regulation of Investment Advisers, Banks, and Broker-Dealers, 6 PEPP. L REV. 31
(1978).
Mutual fund managers may also be viewed to have fiduciary duties under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) (1988). See Clarke Randall, Fiduciary Duties
of Investment Company Directors and Management Companies Under the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 635 (1978). Shareholders may also enforce fiduciary duties
under that Act. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991). The Investment
Company Act of 1940, however, is probably a case where defining specific standards to
enforce a fiduciary role has run riot. See generally John P. Freeman, The Use of Mutual
Funds Assets to Pay Marketing Cost, 9 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 533 (1978) (discussing some of the
complexities of the Investment Company Act of 1940); Joel H. Goldberg, Disinterested
Directors, Independent Directors and the Investment Act of 1940, 9 Lo. U. CHI. LJ. 565
(1978).
167 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
168 Id. at 12 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939)).
In a very early case, Justice Story stated that shareholders' equity in a corporation is-
in the nature of a trust fund for creditors. Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (C.C.D.
Me. 1824). But in 1892 the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that the trust fund theo-
ry was in a shambles. See BAY .S MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL 46
(2d ed. 1981). The scope of fiduciary duties owed by directors to creditors is today quite
limited. See supra.note 142; George S. Corey et al., Are Bond-Holders Owed a Fiduciary Du-
ty?, 18 F.A. ST. U. L REV. 971 (1991).
169 Bankers Lif, 404 U.S. at 11-12 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1934)).
170 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
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as a means "to regulate transactions which constitute no more
than internal corporate mismanagement."
171
These events seemed to herald an era of expanded fiduciary
duties in the federal securities laws. That hope, or fear, was cut
short by the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green.1 72 The Supreme Court would not read a broad fiduciary
concept into rule lOb-5,17 the most frequently litigated provision
of the federal securities laws.174 The Supreme Court, however,
has since sown much confusion because it has held that a person
utilizing "inside" information does not violate rule lOb-5 unless
that person has breached some fiduciary or other duty in obtain-
ing such information. 75  The Supreme Court also continues
seemingly to recognize fiduciary duties under the federal securities
laws even as it acts to limit their scope. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
v. Sandberg,176 for example, the Supreme Court recognized that
directors of corporations have fiduciary duties to shareholders, and
that statements made by a board of directors may be given special
importance by shareholders. Nevertheless, the Court found no
liability for misleading statements in a proxy statement because the
shareholders were not required by law to have voted on the action
171 Bankers Lift, 404 U.S. at 12.
172 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
173 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
174 See generally Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities
Act's Anti-Fraud Provisions: A Familiar Path With Some New Detours, 20 B.C. L. REV. 819
(1979).
The decision in Santa Fe contrasts with the trend in recent years of treating breach
of fiduciary duties by corporate officers as criminal offenses under federal law. See gen-
erally John C. Coffee, Jr., Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduday Breaches and the
Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117 (1981); Peter R.
Ezersky, Note, Intra-Coiporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94
YAUE L.J. 1427 (1985).
175 In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court held that
a printer who purloined confidential financial information from his job materials was not
criminally liable under the federal securities laws for trading on inside information where
there was no fiduciary obligation on his part to disclose that information. See also Dirks v.
SEC,o 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (investment adviser could tip his clients on information re-
ceived from a corporate insider). Compare Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)
(Wall Street Journal reporter liable under rule 10b-5 for "misappropriating" market mov-
ing information from the Journal prior to publication. However, this decision was a 4-4
affirmance of the decision of the Second Circuit).
In United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), the Second
Circuit held that family members and their "tippees" were not under a fiduciary duty to
refrain from trading on confidential information imparted by another family member. See
also Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991) (attorney did not owe fiduciary
duty of disclosure to third parties).
176 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
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in question. 17 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia recently held that a securities broker breached fidu-
ciary duties when it failed to advise customers that they had the
right to disavow unauthorized trades that were placed in, their ac-
countL1' The result of all this is that the federal securities laws
177 Even before the Santa Fe decision, a district court had held in Robinson v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Ala. 1971), affd,
453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972), that a securities broker did not owe a fiduciary duty to its
customers unless there was an express investment advisory contract or unless the custom-
er was "infirm or ignorant of business affairs." Id. at 113. Compare Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981) (broker liable under section 10(b) if trading
was excessive in light of investment objectives, broker exercised control over the trading,
and broker acted with intent to defraud with willful and reckless disregard for investor's
interests) and Mihara v. Dean Whitter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1980) (ac-
count executive has duty not to place his interests over clients by excessive, unwarranted
trading). The Second Circuit has also held that the New York Stock Exchange is not a
fiduciary to investors who deal with its members. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d
Cir.) (or without willful and reckless disregard for investor's interests), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 737 (1944). See generally McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 736
F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir. 1984) (expressing need to show more than a simple broker-
customer contract).
178 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Chong, 901 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.
1990). In Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), affld, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981), the district court held that the fiduciary
duties of a broker would vary, depending on the nature of the account at issue. Those
duties would be more narrow for a "nondiscretionary" account, as opposed to a "discre-
tionary" account in which the broker controls the trading rather than the customer. Id.
at 952-53. The duties associated with a "nondiscretionary" account may include the duty
to recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently and finding a reasonable basis
for doing so; to execute the customer orders promptly; to inform the customer of the
risks of the transaction; to refrain from self-dealing; to not misrepresent material facts;
and to conduct transactions for the customer only upon the customer's authorization. Id.
at 953. The court also stated that the methods for accomplishing these duties might vary,
depending on the sophistication of the customer. Id. In no event would these duties
include a duty either to keep abreast of financial information that would affect the value
of a customer's investment, or to prevent the customer from engaging in a risky transac-
tion, provided that the broker meets the fiduciary duties listed by the court. Id.
In a discretionary account, the Leib court would find enhanced fiduciary duties.
These duties would include a fiduciary duty to manage the account in accordance with
the needs and objectives of the customer, to keep informed regarding changes in the
market which would affect the customers investment; to keep the customer advised of
transactions in the account; and to advise the customer of potential risks for the course
of trading that the broker is engaged in on behalf of the customer. Id. See also Caravan
Mobile Home Sales v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stockbroker assumes no obligation to advise customers of information that may affect
their investment where the account is a non-discretionary account); Thompson McKinnon
Sec., Inc. v. Moore's Farm Supply, 557 F. Supp. 1004, 1011-12 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (securi-
ties broker breached its fiduciary duty when it failed to liquidate a customer account as
directed).
At least one arbitration panel has held, however, that even discount brokers, who
seek to act only in the role as an order taker, must supervise customer trading strategies
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are as muddled as state corporate laws in their application of
fiduciary duties.'
79
F. Law, Economics and Academics
In recent years, scholars have begun to question whether
fiduciary principles may be counterproductive because it is thought
that they reduce the efficiency of business.80 Indeed, the so-
called Chicago school of law and economics has launched what
sometimes appears to be a frontal assault on the fiduciary con-
cept.181 This school argues that contract law should control com-
mercial relationships, 82  and that commercial relationships
should be viewed as being composed of a series of agency costs
and responsibilities. 8 3  That approach has met with
to prevent huge losses. See Milo Geyelin, Discount Broker is Held Liable for Losses, WALL ST.
J., June 18, 1991, at CI. The New York Stock Exchange has also said that discount bro-
kers have a duty to prevent customers from ruining themselves. See Michael Siconolfi,
Discounters Must Watch Out for Customers, Big Board Says, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1991, at Cl;
Michael Siconolfi, Bear Stearns Fined in Case Involving Savvy, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1992, at
C1.
179 The application of fiduciary duties under the federal securities laws has raised
other problems. The concept of fiduciary duties led to the belief that brokers, as agents,
have a duty to obtain the best execution price for customer orders. This has raised seri-
ous and delicate questions in SEC and congressional efforts to establish a central market
system. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-I (1988). See generally Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883 (1981),
revised by and reprinted in I AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES 10, 28-29 (1991) (discussion of "best execution" fiduciary
concerns in the development of a central securities market system).
180 Hu, supra note 86.
181 One author has stated that the fiduciary concept is "the principal device" used
"to restrict the otherwise unfettered powers of persons who are entrusted with control
over the assets and affairs of others." Davis, supra note 112. He notes that economists
have studied the implications of the divergence of interests between fiduciaries and
principals. Id. at 2. As a result of their work, lawyers have begun to question whether the
fiduciary duty mechanism was "short-sighted" and whether "contract and market mecha-
nisms are available to protect the underlying interests of the shareholders more effi-
ciently." Id.
182
Fiduciary law is stricter on fiduciaries than contract law is on ordinary con-
tracting parties in at least four fundamental respects. There are stricter rules
about disclosure, more open-ended duties to act, tighter delineations of rights to
compensation and to benefits that could flow from one's position, and more
intrusive normative rhetoric. These elements of strictness do not arise from actu-
al contracts but have been created by judges in the common law tradition.
Robert C. Clark, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 76, 76 (John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckahuser eds. 1984).
These duties are designed to deter managerial abuse of discretion. Id. at 77.
183 Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate
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opposition." 4 Nevertheless, the courts and the SEC have begun
to consider some aspects of this contractual rights viewpoint and
have begun to limit the role that fiduciary duty may play in cor-
porate law.'
8 -
Another academic view would make fiduciary duties uniform
in all fields of the law. Professor Frankel has argued that fiducia-
ries be treated as a group that is subject to a distinct body of
Contr, 65 Csu.-KENT L. REv. 681 (1989). Law and economic scholars are suspicious of
using fiduciary duties to regulate corporations. They view "the corporation as a nexus of
contracts, [and] treat common law and state statutory provisions as implied terms of a
contract by which both managers and shareholders seek to reduce the agency costs asso-
ciated with centralized management." Id. at 687. This contract model "does not treat
fiduciary rules as the primary tool for reducing agency costs because they require costly
judicial intervention." Id. at 687; see also JAL. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Control-
ling Shareholder's Fiduciary Resosibilitles, 22 WAKE FOREST L REV. 9 (1987) (advocating a
contractual rights model as opposed to a fiduciary duty model for corporations). Even
some of the more ardent free market advocates in this school, however, grant the need
for at least restraining fraud. See generaly United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the
Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J. BUS. 103 (1986); Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross,
Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in the Financial Markets? 105 HARV. L REV. 503
(1991).
One author has posited that officers and directors are fiduciaries because they are
agents of shareholders, and agents have fiduciary responsibilities. Thomas J. Kelly, Eco-
nomic Institutions and Values: Fiduciary Rmsponsibility of Corporate Officers and Directors, 36 NO-
TRE DAME LAW. 343 (1960-61). But see Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60
N.H. 85 (1880) (directors have independent judgement); Robert Cooter & Bradley J.
Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1045 (1991) (application of law and economics to define appropriate role of
fiduciary duties).
184 "Because directors manage the shareholders' investment, they should be held
accountable for their misdeeds. The age-old analogy of corporate directors to trustees is
not misplaced." Thomas L. Hazen, Coporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-
The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L REV. 171, 179 (1987). See generally Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance; Ageny Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contrac, 85 COLUM. L.'REV. 1403 (1985); Paul
N. Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness: Justifications
for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60
TEMP. LQ. 47 (1987); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor An Analysis of Fiduciary Obl-
gation, 1988 DUKE LJ. 879; Thomas I Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market)
Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. I REV. 273 (1991); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories,
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L REV. 851
(1992).
185 In Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 901 (1988), a judge from the so-called school of law and economics stated that:
Because the fiduciary duty is a standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties
would agree to if they dickered about the subject explicitly, parties may contract
with greater specificity for other arrangements. It is a violation of duty to steal
from the corporate treasury; it is not a violation to write oneself a check that
the board has approved as a bonus.
Id. at 436.
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policies, principles, and rules. This is in contrast to the present
law which treats fiduciaries as being of varying types with varying
duties. 86 Until Professor Frankel's position is adopted, however,
the present law will continue to recognize that some fiduciary rela-
tionships are more intense than others. In other words, "[t]he
greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary,
the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty."117 For example,
agents, trustees, and corporate managers are all fiduciaries and are
subject to the fiduciary principle of loyalty, although not to the
same extent.18
IV. FIDUCIARY DuTIEs UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE AcT
A. Legislation
Until this century, commodity brokers were regulated almost
entirely by state law. Under state law, "[t]he agency of a stock or
commodity broker, contemplating as it does the dealing in the
money and other property of his principal, is fiduciary in na-
ture."189 As such, the broker was viewed as a "quasi-trustee"19
who had to act with the "utmost good faith and integrity."191
In 1922, the federal government began to regulate the futures
markets.'92 That legislation, however, proved to be ineffective, as
186 Frankel, supra note 50; see also J.C. Shepherd, Note, Towards a Unified Concept of
Fiduciay Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51 (1981) (discussion of unifying fiduciary princi-
ples).
187 Scott, supra note 48, at 541.
188 Id For a discussion of the duty of loyalty owed by corporate officials, see David
S. Ruder, Duty of Lo)aly-A Law Professor's Status Repor, 40 BUS. LAw. 1383 (1985).
189 CHARLES MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES AND OF COM-
MODITY BROKERS AND COMMODITY ExcHANGES 251 (1931). But see DeSciose v. Chiles,
Heider & Co., 476 N.W.2d 200 (Neb. 1991); Vogelaar v. H.L. Robbins & Co., 204 N.E.2d
461 (Mass. 1965).
190 MEYER, supra note 189, at 252.
191 Id. at 253, 265-66.
192 Initially, Congress adopted the Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
The Supreme Court, however, declared that statute to be an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional taxing power. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). Undaunted, Congress
reenacted the legislation under its commerce power, and named it the Grain Futures Act
of 1922, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). The legislation was then held to be constitutional. Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 839 (1923). The Grain Futures Act established a licens-
ing system that designated commodity exchanges as "contract markets." The Act required
all futures trading to be conducted on such contract markets, and required contract
markets to police their members and prevent them from engaging in price manipula-
tions.
There were very few other protections in the statute that were designed to protect
the public specifically or to establish fiduciary duties. Even before the adoption of this
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evidenced by the effects of the stock market crash of 1929 on the
futures markets.19 President Roosevelt then called for legislation
to regulate both the securities and futures markets. 9 4 Legislation
was not adopted in the commodity futures area, however, until
1936. That legislation, the Commodity Exchange Act,'95 carried
forward the licensing system that had been utilized in the 1922
legislation for exchanges. In addition, it effectively regulated the
activities of brokerage firms for the first time. These brokerage
firms, called "futures commission merchants," had to be licensed
in order to solicit and execute customer orders on the exchang-
es." Additionally, the Act required brokers to segregate their
customer margin funds from the brokerage firm's own mon-
ies 9  This was a recognition that these funds were held in what
amounted to a trust for customers. Congress thought that such a
segregation would prevent customer funds from being improperly
used to margin the accounts of other customers or for the propri-
etary trading of the futures commission merchant 98 This trust
fund theory remains in the present legislation.
to
legislation, however, the Federal Trade Commission had suggested in a massive study of
the commodity markets that brokers owed fiduciary duties to customers. It did not specify
what those duties were. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE, 5 Fu-
TURES TRADING OPERATIONS IN GRAIN 318-19 (1920).
At least some futures traders could have benefitted from an expansive application of
fiduciary duties. For example, John Anderson Truman lost about $40,000 in futures trad-
ing in 1901, causing his son to forsake a college education and to give up his piano
lessons. The son's sense of loss from those deprivations was plain even after he became
the President of the United States. RIcHARD L. MILLER, TRUMAN: THE RISE TO POwER 41,
47 (1985). Lyndon Johnson's father also thrust his family into poverty as a result of his
cotton futures speculations. ROBERT DAILEK, LONE STAR RISING: LYNDON JOHNSON AND
His TIMES 1908-1960 24 (1991). The richest man in the world at that time, H.L. Hunt,
lost everything in the futures markets before he acquired his oil fortune. Two of his
sons, Nelson Bunker and Herbert, have not been so lucky. HARRY HURT, TEXAS RICH:
THE HU r DYNASTY FROM THE EARLY DAYs THROUGH THE SILVER CRASH 28, 47-48 (1981).
193 WILLIAM R. KLINGAMAN, 1929: THE YEAR OF THE GREAT CRASH 338 (1989); Wheat's
Plunge to a 300 Year Low, LITERARY DIG., Nov. 12, 1932, at 6.
194 H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). President Roosevelt had stated
that federal regulation was necessary "for the protection of investors." Id.
195 Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 1, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amend-
ed at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988)).
196 7 U.S.C. § 6d.
197 See id.
198 Note, Legislation, The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, U. PA. L REv. 614, 618
(1937); see also Grain Futures Act AmendmenL Hearings on H.R. 11952 Before the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, at 11-12 (1928) ("these provisions seem entirely
clear and should prevent losses which frequently occur to customers through the financial
failures of commission houses resulting from the use of margin monies for their own
speculative purposes.").
199 Customers funds enjoy special. trust fund status in bankruptcy proceedings so that,
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The Commodity Exchange Act imposed other standards that
seem to be based on concepts of fiduciary duties. Indeed, a "fun-
damental purpose" of the Commodity Exchange Act was "to en-
sure fair practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchang-
es .... "' Among other things, futures commission merchants
and other contract market members were prohibited from conduct
considered to be fraudulent. This included making false state-
ments, cheating or defrauding customers, and similar activities.
2 01
In addition, following fiduciary principles, the Act prohibited floor
brokers212 from taking the opposite side of a customer's order
without the customer's permission. 23 The Act also prohibited
certain trading practices on the floors of exchange such as "wash"
trades, "fictitious" trades, and "accommodation" trades.
20
4
The Commodity Exchange Act made principals, such as fu-
tures commission merchants, liable for the activities of their
agents. 25 There was also a recognition that large traders owed
duties to other participants in the market. For example, the Act
sought to prohibit manipulation of market prices,206  and it
sought to avoid the effects of "excessive" speculation by imposing
customers have preference over other creditors. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 556
(1988). Regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act also establish a "legal" list of
permitted investments for customer funds. 17 C.F.R. § 1.25 (1992). See generaly CFTC In-
terpretative Letter No. 86-21, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
123,266 (1986); CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 84-24, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) [22,449 (1984); Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin,
Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures Brokers Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers From
Troubled Firns, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 849 (1987); Frederick L. White, The Commodity
Related Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 34 REC. ASs'N B. N.Y. 262 (Apr. 1979).
200 H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). The Act "simply provides for
honesty in the conduct of what are important public markets." Id. at 2-3.
201 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1936).
202 A floor broker executes customer orders on the floors of the exchange. 7 U.S.C.
§ 6e. Traders on the floor of an exchange who simply trade for their own account are
not required to register;, although recent legislation now requires such registration. Fu-
tures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992); see H.R.
REP. No. 978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 16 (1992); H.R. 2869, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 205
(1989); H.R. REP. No. 236, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 205 (1989).
203 7 U.S.C. § 6(b). This provision also prohibited futures commission merchants
from taking customer orders into their own account, rather than executing the orders on
an exchange. Id.
204 7 U.S.C. § 6(c).
205 7 U.S.C. § 4. As discussed above, agency liability is premised around fiduciary du-
ties. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Markham v. Joudan, 41 N.Y. 235, 244-45
(1869), the leading case in the area, established that a broker executing customer orders
was an agent of the customer. This meant applying fiduciary principles rather than the
law of vendor-vendee. MEYER, supra note 189, at 245-50.




limits on the size of positions that could be held by specula-
tors.
207
Unfortunately, the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 did not
prove effective in dealing with market abuses, and it could not
accommodate the explosive growth that occurred in futures trad-
ing in the 1970s. 21' Therefore, the statute was expanded in 1974
to include every commodity involved in futures trading; before
1974, the Act had been amended in a piecemeal fashion as new
commodities became the subject of futures trading.2° In addi-
tion, Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion ("CFTC")., a new independent federal agency, to administer
the statute.210 Previously, the Act had been administered by the
Commodity Exchange Authority, a small agency within the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.21' Congress extended vast powers to the
CFTC, including the authority to seek injunctive relief against
violators of the statute,1 2 and the authority to impose civil pen-
alties of up to $100,000 per violation.213
Interestingly, the new amendments did little to expand the
duties of market participants or to impose higher standards. For
the most part, the amendments simply brought an increased num-
ber of market participants under the registration requirements of
the statute and expanded the range of sanctions for violating
existing requirements. The new registrants included commodity
trading advisers,1 4 the analogue of which has been held to bear
207 7 U.S.C. § 6a.
208 S&e supra note 28 and accompanying text.
209 These amendments were contained in the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). For a history of the piece-
meal amendments that had been previously made to the Commodity Exchange Act to
include new commodities that became subject to commodity futures trading, see H.R.
REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974).
210 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1974).
211 The Commodity Exchange Authority was subject to oversight by the Commodity
Exchange Commission, which was composed of the Secretaries for Agriculture and Com-
merce and the Attorney General of the United States. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 36 (1974).
The Commodity Exchange Authority had held that the breach of a fiduciary duty
by a broker or other agent of a commodity futures customer is fraudulent. Agency re-
quires good faith and any breach of good faith was deemed to be fraudulent. In re
Steen, 21 Agri. Dec. 1076, 1089 (1962). See generally In re Sicinski, 25 Agric. Dec. 302,
307 (1966); In re Marks, 22 Agric. Dec. 761, 773 (19683).
212 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1974).
213 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1974).
214 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1974). The term commodity trading adviser is defined in the
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1992). See generally CFTC v. Sav-
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fiduciary responsibilities in the securities area.215 Another new
registrant was the commodity pool operator,216 which is similar
in its activities to mutual funds that have been heavily regulated
with fiduciary duties in mind.217 The amended statute also re-
quired the registration of brokerage firm agents, the employees of
commodity trading advisers, and commodity pool operators.218
B. The CFTC Grapples with Fiduciary Duties
1. Customer Protection Proposals
Early in its history, the CFTC proposed a package of customer
protection rules that were allegedly based on a "congressional
recognition of the fiduciary nature of the commodity professional's
relationship with his customer."21 9 The proposed rules included a
requirement that futures commission merchants (commodity bro-
kers) not recommend futures transactions that were unsuitable for
their customers.' 0 Another proposal required that brokerage
firms supervise their employees diligently in order to protect cus-
tomers from undisciplined and untrained employee. 22 1  The
CFTC proposed prohibiting "churning," the excessive trading of an
account controlled by a broker.1 2 The CFTC additionally pro-
age, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing role of commodity trading adviser).
215 Supra note 189.
216 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1974).
217 Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 805 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing
commodity pool operator); Rosenthal & Co. v. CFIC, 802 F.2d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 1986)
(same).
218 7 U.S.C. § 6k (1974).
219 Proposed Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals for the Protection of
Customers, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,474, at 21,926
(Sept. 6, 1977) (the author-was involved in the formulation of these proposals while em-
ployed at the CBTC) [hereinafter Proposed Standards]. The CFTC cited as authority for
this proposition certain antifraud provisions in the Commodity Exchange Act and a pro-
vision stating that the activities of commodity trading advisers and commodity pool oper-
ators are affected with a national public interest. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 61-6o (1974). These pro-
posals were also based in part on the recommendations of an industry advisory commit-
tee that concluded that increased standards for commodity professionals were needed to
increase public confidence in the futures markets. ADVISORY COMMrTtEE, COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, REPORT ON COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING PROFESSIONALS
(1976).
220 This doctrine was borrowed from the SEC and is intertwined with the SEC's so-
called "shingle" theory. See supra note 164; THOMAs L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 424 (2d ed. 1990).
221 This concept was also borrowed from the SEC. See NICHOLAS WOLFSON ET AL.,
REGULATION OF BROKER DEALERS IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1977).
222 Churning had long been held to be a violation of the federal securities laws. See,
e.g., WOLFSON, supra note 221, § 2.11. Such conduct was also previously held to be a vio-
[Vol. 68:199
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
posed that brokers be required to supply customers with a pre-
scribed, short, plain language statement of the risks of commodity
futures trading." Other proposals included a requirement that
brokers handling discretionary accounts obtain froin the account
holder written authorization to initiate trades instead of doing so
without first seeking permission.224 The CFTC proposals also
would have required that brokers use "due diligence" in executing
customer orders."
This rather full package of customer protection proposals met
with a storm of industry opposition, especially the suitability pro-
posal. As a result, the rules that were eventually adopted were a
slimmed-down version of the original proposals. The adopted rules
included the supervisory requirement, the written trading authori-
zation for discretionary accounts, and the short form risk disclo-
sure statement. 2 ' The CFTC sought to justify its failure to adopt
the remaining proposals, including due diligence, churning, and
suitability, on the grounds that these requirements were already
inherent in the Commodity Exchange Act. The CFrC stated that
it did not want to narrow those requirements by adopting rules
that could be too restrictive.2
The CFTC later ruled in an adjudicative proceeding that
churning was indeed an inherent prohibition in the antifraud
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act.227 The CFTC later
lation of the Commodity Exchange Act. Follansbee v. Davis, Kaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673,
676-77 (9th Cir. 1982); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133-34 (8th
Cir. 1970); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 432-35 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
aF'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
223 This concise risk disclosure statement is in stark contrast to, the long, complex
prospectuses required for investor protection under the federal securities laws that seek
disclosure of all "material" facts; See generally HAZEN, supra note 220, at 93-96.
224 Discretionary accounts are particularly susceptible to abuse. CFTC v. Savage, 611
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979); 113 CONG. REc. 23,652 (Aug. 22, 1967); COMMODrY EXCHANGE
AuTHORrT, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CIRCULAR No. 539 (1939); REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF
THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ADMIN. 37 (1939). Commodity exchanges have stringent rules
for discretionary accounts. For example, most exchanges prohibit discretionary accounts
unless they maintain a minimum level of funds. The apparent thrust of these exchange
rules is to prevent small customers from participating in discretionary accounts and to
limit their losses. See generally In re Paragon Futures Ass'n, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 25,266 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 1, 1992). The CFTC declined to follow such an approach in its
customer protection proposals. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,642 (July 24, 1978) [hereinafter Protection
Rul-].
225 17 C.F.R. §§ 166.2-.3 (1992). The CFTC risk disclosure requirement is set forth at
17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1992).
226 Protection Rules, supra note 224, at 22,625.
227 See, eg., Gilbert v. Refco, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,081 (C.F.T.C.
1992]
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held, however, that there was no suitability requirement inherent
in that Act.28
2. The Scienter Issue
As another part of its initial regulatory efforts, the CFTC held
in Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,21 that the antifraud pro-
visions of the Commodity Exchange Act did not contain a scienter
requirement because the principal-agent relationship between
customers and commodity professionals "necessarily" meant that
commodity professionals "stand in a fiduciary relationship" to
customers.2 1 Citing securities law cases, the CFTG stated that, as
June 27, 1991); Halterman v. Eastern Capital Corp., 11987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,222 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 15, 1988); Stahl v. Woodstock Commodities,
Int'l, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,203 (C.F.T.C. Aug.
14, 1986); In re Cayman Assocs. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,033 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 21, 1986); Dunn v. Contemporary Fin. Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,955 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 25, 1986); Meridan Brick,
Inc. v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,608 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 29, 1985); Fields v. Cayman Assocs., [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,688 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 2, 1985); Lehman v. Madda
Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) J[ 22,417 (C.F.T.C.
Nov. 13, 1984); In re Lincoln Wood Commodities, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,986 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984).
228 Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,250 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 5, 1986). Prior to the Phacel/i decision, the CFTC had
begun a decisive retreat from its assertion that suitability was inherent in the Commodity
Exchange Act. Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,379 at 25,830 n.4 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 13, 1982); Jensen v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,324, at
21,324 n.1 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 9, 1981).
In rejecting a suitability rule as implicit, the CFrC relied on its disclosure require-
ments to assure that the customer was making a "knowing and meaningful election to
undertake the risks of commodity futures trading. . . ." Phacdli [1986-87 Transfer Bind-
er] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 23,250 at 32,674. In proposing the suitability rule,
however, the CFTC stated that:
Suitability and disclosure are separate concepts .... The Commission is con-
sidering the adoption of a suitability rule precisely because disclosure alone does
not sufficiently protect some customers from high-pressure sales tactics .... In
addition, the proposed rule is predicated in substantial measure on the principle
that . . . a market professional'. . . has the special skill and background to asses
the degree of risk involved in the trade.
Proposed Standards, supra note 219 at 21,929.
229 [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 21,016 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 10,
1980), aff'd sub nom., Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc. v. CFTC, Civ. No. 80-7212 (9th Cir.
Feb. 12, 1982).
230 Id. at 23,981-82. The CFTC drew 'a distinction between common law fraud and
constructive fraud. Id. at 23,976. Intent and falsehood are needed to establish common
law fraud but those elements are not required for constructive fraud. 3 JoHN N.
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a fiduciary, a commodity professional who provides commodity ad-
vice has a duty to know all material market facts and to disclose
those facts to the customer. In addition, commodity professionals
have a fiduciary duty to have an adequate and reasonable basis for
any trading advice rendered to customers.31
3. Proposed Disclosure Requirement
Following the expansive approach taken in the Gordon deci-
sion, the CFTC later sought to strengthen the role of the disclo-
sure statement required to be given to customers under its cus-
tomer rules. The proposal stated that the delivery of the risk dis-
closure statement would not relieve a futures commission mer-
chant of the obligation to disclose "all material facts" to customers.
The CFTC premised the proposal on what it believed were the fi-
duciary duties owed by futures commission merchants to their
customers. 2
The CFTC proposal met with strong industry criticism. The
CFTC, therefore, modified its proposal to state more ambiguously
that the risk disclosure statement did not relieve a futures commis-
sion merchant from any other disclosure obligations it might have
under applicable law.23 The amendment did not state what
those obligations might be, leaving open the question that had
apparently been resolved in Gordon-that all material risks must be
disclosed.
POMEROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 922 (5th ed. 1941). See generally Henry B. Borders,
Note, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder as Appllied to Commodities Fraud: No Intent Required, 79
KY. LJ. 369 (1990-91).
The CFrC also stated in Gordon that the scope of the fiduciary duties of commodity
professionals may vary, depending on whether they are simply a conduit for orders or
whether they act as advisers. Gordon, [1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) 21,016, at 23,981-82.
231 Supra note 189. See generally In re Haltmier, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,160 (C.F.T.C. May 5, 1976), aJJ'd, 554 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977)
(customers repose a high degree of trust in their brokers). In Wattay v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc., CFTC Doc. No. R 76-22 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 20, 1981), the CFrC again stated a
fiduciary duty was breached when a broker failed to properly record a trade. It noted,
however, that the relationship may be flexible and may impose different duties depend-
ing on whether the broker has substantial discretion or is simply an order taker.
232 [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 21,620 at 23,360-61
(Nov. 23, 1982).
233 Protection of Commodity Customers: Risk Disclosure by Futures Commission Merchants and
Introducing Brokers to Customers [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fu. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,482, at 30,138 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 8, 1985).
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The CFTC release announcing the adoption of this more
ambiguous language did state, as did the Gordon decision, that the
nature and extent of disclosures that must be made would depend
on the facts and circumstances of the particular transaction.
23 4
The GFTC release also set forth its view that a breach of fiduciary
duty owed to a customer by a commodity professional was suffi-
cient to establish a violation of the antifraud provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act. It indicated that this fiduciary duty
might establish duties beyond what normally would apply under
those antifraud provisions. 235 The CFTC stated, however, that its
proposed amendment was not intended to impose a uniform duty
of disclosure on brokers or require that customers be furnished
with a long prospectus or that lengthy verbal disclosures be made.
Moreover, the CFTC was of the view that there might be a sliding
scale of fiduciary duties. For example, the duty of a futures com-
mission merchant to disclose information to a customer with a
discretionary account is broader than the duty of a broker who is
simply executing customer orders.36
4. Gordon is Overruled
The disclosure amendment seemed to signal a retreat from
the expansive view of fiduciary duties that was set forth in the
CFTC's decision in Gordon, and it introduced some uncertainty as
to the scope of fiduciary duties under the Commodity Exchange
Act. This was compounded when the CFTC began to retreat from
the Gordon decision.37 That somewhat disorderly withdrawal was
occasioned by the fact that many courts had rejected the CFTC's
conclusion that scienter was not required under section 4b.38
Some ten years after Gordon, the CFTC finally recognized that the
courts would not accept its views on scienter, and the CFTC over-
ruled Gordon.29 In the meantime, however, the CFTC handed
234 IiL
235 Id.
236 I& at 30,139-40.
237 See generay Munnell v. PaineWebber, Jackson & Curtis, [1987-1990 Transfer Bind-
er] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) [ 23,313, at 32,862 n.5 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 8, 1986); Wills v.
First Fin. Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,605
(C.F.T.C. May 31, 1985).
238 See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) SAL., 838 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1988); Hill v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1986); Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985); Masters Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management Co.,
586 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1978).
239 Hammond v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
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down other decisions that were based either in whole or in part
on findings of a breach of fiduciary duties. For. example, in In re
Murphy,2 ° the CFTC held that a floor broker was a fiduciary in
executing customer orders. The CFTC further held in several cases
that a fiduciary duty was breached where full disclosures of risks
were not made or where there were misrepresentations.24' A re-
Comm. Fu. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,617 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 1, 1990). Compare Ruddy v. First
Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,435
(C.F.T.C. Mar. 31, 1981) with In re Conticommodity Servs., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 25,038 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 17, 1991) (scienter not required under antifraud rule for foreign
futures contracts traded in United States even though rule had been adopted to elimi-
nate such a requirement).
240 [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 22,798 (C.F.T.C. Sept.
25, 1985).
241 Tysdal v. Jack Carl/312 Futures, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,242
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 27, 1992); Schneider v. Rouse Woodstock, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Bind-
er] Conm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,196 (C.F.T.C. July 31, 1986) (a broker has a fidu-
dary duty to disclose the risks of commodity futures trading); Riebold v. First Commodity
Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,080 (C.F.T.C. May
20, 1986) (broker's fiduciary duties require a full disclosure of all material facts). See
generaly Grift v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,962
(C.F.T.C. Nov. 27, 1990); Swickard v. AG. Edwards & Sons, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,522, at 30,275 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 7, 1985); Arnow v. First
Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 22,282,
at 29,429 n.4 (C.F.T.C. July 13, 1984); Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,379, at 25,831 n.8 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 13,
1982); Ruddy v. First Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 21,435, at 26,085 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 31, 1981); Yameen v. Madda Trading Co.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,125, at 24,558 (C.F.T.C.
Oct. 8, 1980).
Judgment officers and administrative law judges employed by the CFrC have also
issued numerous opinions on the scope and application of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Hill
v. Merrill Lynch Futures, 2 Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 24,459 (C.F.T.C. May 17, 1989)
(degree of fiduciary duty varies with the knowledge and sophistication of the customer);
Lang v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,256 (C.F.T.C. May
31, 1988) (a "full-service broker" did not owe a customer a duty to monitor a
nondiscretionary account); Gropper v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L
Rep. (CCH) 1 24,185 (C.F.T.C. May 7, 1988) (breach of fiduciary duty 'found where
broker did not provide oral confirmation of a trade as was customary); Schindel Agri-
Sales v. PaineWebber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,094
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 5, 1988) (broker has a fiduciary duty to seek clarification of any ambigu-
ous or any incomplete orders); Sane v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ' 24,088 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 29, 1987) (breach of fiduciary duty found where
discretionary account was iot traded as agreed with customer); Walkington v. First Com-
modity Corp., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,033 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1987) (breach of
fiduciary duty occurred where risks of trading were minimized), dismissed on other grounds,
[1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 24,335 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 13, 1988);
Mancik v. Apache Trading Corp., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,032 (C.F.T.C. Nov.
30, 1987) (breach of fiduciary duty found where customer was not advised that his ac-
count executive had left the brokerage firm); Moravec v. Stanford Management Corp.,
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[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,757 (C.F.T.C. June 29,
1987) (fiduciary duty breached by a misrepresentation of risks); Merwin v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,756
(C.F.T.C. June 26, 1987) (section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act imposes fiduciary
duties intended prohibit constructive fraud); Secrest v. Madda Trading Co., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,593 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 24, 1987) (breach
of fiduciary duty found where misrepresentations were made and a customer account was
churned); Koprowski v. Gannon, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 23,151, at 32,375 (C.F.T.C. July 15, 1986) (the fiduciary duty of a broker "broadens
concomitantly with any expansion of the degree of trust reposed in the professional;"
breach of fiduciary duty occurs when a broker downplays the risks of trading and the
importance of risk disclosure statements); Wolken v. Refco, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,152 (C.F.T.C. July 14, 1986), vacated and re-
manded, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,779 (C.F.T.C. Aug.
27, 1987), appeal dismised 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,509 (C.F.T.C. July 18,
1989); Kightlinger v. Performance Inv. Co., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 23,021 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 30, 1986) (breach of fiduciary duty found where
customer was told to continue and await corrective action); Myhre v. First Commodity.
Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,001 (C.F.T.C. Apr.
16, 1986) (breach of fiduciary duty where customer not informed that broker handling
his discretionary account would no longer be handing the account), aff'd on other grounds,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,487 (C.F.T.C. Feb, 12,
1987); Bey v. Feeney, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,998
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 11, 1986) (breach of fiduciary duty found where customer not informed
of the financial problems of the broker nor kept informed of the status of his account);
Yi v. International Trading Group, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) 22,958 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 13, 1986) (fiduciary duties will vary depending on the
sophistication of the customer); Hickle v. Commodity Fluctuation Sys., Inc., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,956 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 28, 1986) (broker
has fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts and risks); Chabala v. First Commodity
Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,922 (C.F.T.C. Jan.
31, 1986) (fiduciary duty of a broker requires disclosure of risk); Dow v. Appleman,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,852 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 26,
1985) (broker had fiduciary duty to inform customers of fraudulent dealings that the
broker learned of following the establishment of the customer accounts questioned);
Jones v. First Fin. Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,779, at 31,133-234 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 30, 1985) (fiduciary duty required disclosure of all
material facts and clear representations of risks); Kahn v. First Commodity Corp., [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,668, at 30,844 (C.F.T.C. July 31,
1985) (high pressure sales pitches violated fiduciary duty), af'd in part, rev'd in part,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,306 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 30,
1986); Katz v. Newcomb Commodities Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,607 at 30,603 (C.F.T.C. May 3, 1985) (fiduciary duty breached by trad-
ing practices); Syndicate Sys., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 22,451, at 29,994-96 (C.F.T.C. Dec.
19, 1984) (no breach of fiduciary duty found), afT'd, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,289 (C.P.T.C. Sept. 30, 1986); Milano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuL L Rep. (CCH) 22,416,
at 29,864-65 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 31, 1984) (breach of fiduciary duty results in violation of
antifraud provision even if breach was negligent or unintentional); Oblon v. Yorkstone
Research Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,425, at
29,897 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 30, 1984) (failure to disclose commission payments and overcharge
was a breach of fiduciary duty); Holmes v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer
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cent CFTC decision also stated that a broker has an ongoing duty
to disclose material information to customers, even if the customer
does not ask for that information. 42 In another decision, howev-
er, the CFTC held that a broker has no fiduciary duty to disclose
information to customers about day-to-day market moves.243 More
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,669, at 30,847 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 31, 1984) (Com-
mission Merchant has fiduciary duty to disclose material facts), aft'd mem., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,103 (C.F.T.C. June 13, 1986); Keyser
v. Green, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,320, at 29,553
(C.F.T.C. Aug. 17, 1984) (account executive has a fiduciary duty to inform himself as to
the actual state of customer's account and to make recommendations and take actions
based upon this knowledge); Sudol v. Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,112, at 28,894 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 27, 1984) (broker
has a fiduciary duty to know all material facts reasonably ascertainable in connection with
customer's trading decision), rev'd on other grounds, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,748 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1985); Zadik v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,036,
at 28,630 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984) (no breach of fiduciary duty where customer con-
trolled his own account); Ettinghaus v. Chartered Sys. Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,897, at 23,641 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 19, 1979) (full and fair
disclosure of all material facts is required); Klatt v. International Trading Group, [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,636, at 22,598 (C.F.T.C. June 21,
1978) (commodity professional is necessarily in a fiduciary relationship with a customer
or prospective customer); Wilke v. Winchester-Hardin-Oppenheimer Trading Co., [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 20,605, at 22,502 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 29,
1977) ("It is, by now, axiomatic that a breach of fiduciary duty is fraud within the mean-
ing of Section 4b of the Act."); see also Jerry W. Markham & Kyra H. Bergin, Customer
Rights Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1299, 1344 n.231 (1984) (case
citing same proposition).
242 The CFTC has not backed off its conclusion that brokers should have a reason-
able basis for making recommendations to customers. See supra note 231 and accompa-
nying text. The basis for these decisions seems to be the belief that a commodity profes-
sional is making an implied representation that there is a reasonable basis for that rec-
ommendation. Hanay v. First Commodity Corp., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 23,936, at 34,282, n.3 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 21, 1987); Fox v. First Nat'l Mon-
etary Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,690, at 33,784
n.12 (C.F.T.C. June 25, 1987); Syndicate Sys., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,289, at 32,788
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1986).
243 Grist v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,962 (C.F.T.C.
Nov. 27, 1990); see also Holmes v. Wheat Inv. Advisors Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,653 (C.F.T.C. June 8, 1987) (the degree of fiduciary
duty will vary among discretionary and nondiscretionary accounts).
In Diaz v. First Commodity Corp., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,164 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 17, 1988) an administrative law judge found that a bro-
ker breached a fiduciary duty where he had charged a customer a management fee that
was so excessive as to preclude any possibility of profit. See also Chabala v. First Commod-
ity Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,922 (C.F.T.C.
Jan. 31, 1986). The CFTC, however, subsequently concluded that it did not regulate the
amount of fees charged by brokers. The CFTC stated that it would not pass on the issue
of a customer's agreement to pay fees even if the fees are so high as to be "unconscio-
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recently, a series of CFTC decisions that seem to be creating a
"buyer-beware" standard in the futures industry has led to congres-
sional hearings on whether greater customer protection is need-
ed.
24
The regulation of commodity pool operators and commodity
trading advisers by the CFTC raises another area of concern.
CFTC regulations required such entities to give broad disclosures
to their customers. This is one of the few areas where the CFTC
had sought specific disclosures in other than a very summary
form. The required disclosures included possible conflicts of inter-
est, prior trading losses and successes (track records), disclosure of
all fees, commissions, and other information pertinent to the deci-
sion on whether to invest in a commodity pool or to retain the
services of a commodity trading adviser. These regulations seemed
to recognize that commodity trading advisers and commodity pool
operators owe greater duties to their customers and that their
customers need special protection.2 5 This conceptual approach
nable" or "per se" fraudulent. Johnson v. Fleck, 2 Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 24,957
(C.F.T.C. Nov. 20, 1990); see also Tysdal v. Jack Cari/312 Futures, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 25,242 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 27, 1992) (the mere existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship would not transform a breach of contract into a violation of the antifraud provi-
sions of the Commodity Exchange Act).
244 Kevin G. Salwen & Sandra Block, CFTC Gets in the Habit of Reecting Advise of Its
Own Judges in Disdcplinary Cases, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1992, at Cl; Kevin G. Salwen,
CFTC's Policies on Enforcement Are Under Study, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1992, at C13; Kevin G.
Salwen, CFTC Rulings Draw Citicrsm From Dissident, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1992, at CI;
Kevin G. Salwen, Two Congressmen to Seek to Revive CFT' Decisions, WALL ST. J., May 20,
1992, at C19.
Commissioner Fowler C. West has repeatedly pointed out in several dissenting and
concurring opinions efforts to cut back on consumer protection. See, e.g., In re Paragon
Futures Ass'n, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,266 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 1, 1992) (dissent);
Van Arsdale v. Nationwide Futures Corp., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,246
(C.F.T.C. Mar. 6, 1992); Steen v. Monex Int'l Ltd., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,245 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 3, 1992) (Commissioner West dissenting and concurring); Tysdal v.
Jack Carl/312 Futures, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,242 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 27, 1992);
Muniz v Lassila, 2 Comm. FuL L Rep. (CCH) 1 25,225 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 17, 1992); Gilbert
v. Refco, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 25,081 (C.F.T.C. June 27, 1991) (dissent);
In re Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 2 Comm. Fu. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,038 (C.F.T.C. Apr.
27, 1991) (dissent); Morris v. Stotler & Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,080
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 1, 1991) (dissent). The CFTC's opinions causing this concern have been
based principally on an expanded application of a requirement to show that fraud or
other misbehavior actually caused the customer loss. Id. This has resulted in a higher
burden of proof for sophisticated and experienced customers. Id. For a discussion of
causation principles under the federal securities laws, see 2 THOMAS L. HAzEN, THE LAW
OF SECURMES REGULATION §§ 13.5-.6 (2d ed. 1990).
245 Apparently scienter requirements for commodity pool operators and commodity
trading advisers are lower under a special antifraud provision for such persons than un-
der section 4b. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988) (requiring that a person act "willfully") with
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seemed to parallel, albeit on a much smaller scale, some of the
regulations imposed under the federal securities law for trading
advisers and investment companies."' The CFTC's tougher ap-
proach for advisers and pool operators was also consistent with the
sliding scale approach expressed in the Gordon decision and in its
release on risk disclosures. 47 Recently, however, the CFTG an-
nounced that it would be reducing the amount of disclosures
required for commodity pool operators and that more detailed
disclosures would be available only on request.
248
The role of fiduciary duties under the Commodity Exchange
Act raises other issues. For example, as noted above 24 9 section 4d
of the Commodity Exchange Act? 0 requires customer margin
funds to be maintained in segregated trust accounts. It appears
that section 4d was designed to impose a fiduciary duty upon fu-
tures commission merchants to protect customer funds.25 1 If so,
7 U.S.C. § 6o (1988) (failing to use "willfully"). See generaly Messer v. E. F. Hutton &
Co., 833 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1987), amended on rehk, 847 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1988); First
Monetary Corp. v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334 (6th Cir. 1987); CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Peabody Trading Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,926 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 19, 1983).
246 SEC regulations are considerably more intrusive than the CFTC. Compare 17 C.F.R.
§§ 4.14.41 (1988) (setting out rules for commodity pool operations and commodity trad-
ing regulators) with 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.020 to 206(9)-4 (1992) (outlining rules and regula-
tions for investment advisers) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)
(establishing rules for investment companies). The SEC, however, seems to be borrowing
a page from the CFTC's book by requiring penny stock dealers to provide their custom-
ers summary disclosure documents before trading. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,033 (1992) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-2).
247 See supra notes 22930 and accompanying text.
248 Exemption for Commodity Poll Operators and Commodity Trading Advisers for Offeings to
Qualified Eligible Partidpans 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,215 (Jan. 28, 1992);
Kevin G. Salwen, SEC, CFTC Unveil About 100 Moves to Trim Red Tape; WALL ST. J., Apr.
29, 1992, at C19.
249 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
250 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1988).
251 Section 4d of the Commodity Exchange Act has as its "aim only to impose the
duties of a fiduciary upon a class of men who, under accepted legal theory as well as by
every consideration of policy, ought to bear such obligations." Comment, Legislation, The
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 618 (1937). Its 'terms were a rec-
ognition that the use of customer funds to finance the operations of futures commission
merchants or favored customers could result in losses to innocent customers. H.R. REP.
No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974). This provision was adopted over industry objec-
tions that trust fund treatment of customers was not realistic because of the flexibility
needed by futures commission merchants to deal with customer margin funds. Regulation
of Grain Exchanges: Hearing on H.R. 8829 Before the House Comm. on Agric., 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 149 (1934) ("a system devised to extend legal trust fund treatment to customers'
margin deposits could not operate with the required flexible attitude and would be most
cumbersome and difficult to operate if indeed not impossible").
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the fiduciary relationship is a somewhat odd one.5 2 Under an
ordinary trust, a trustee cannot retain the profits from investments
of the corpus of the trust. This is a strict rule. s A regulation
under the Commodity Exchange Act, however, permits a futures
commission merchant to retain the interest from investment of
customer funds held in the segregated accounts required by sec-
tion 4." 254 To date, the courts have upheld this regulation.255
Still another area of ambivalence and ambiguity in the appli-
cation of fiduciary duties under the Commodity Exchange Act
involves a practice known as "dual" trading, which involves traders
on the floors of the exchanges. Under existing law, a trader can
both execute customer orders on the floor of the exchange and
trade for his or her own account at the same time. This creates
an inherent conflict. On the one hand, floor brokers act as agents
of a customer in executing the order. On the other, in trading for
their own accounts, floor traders act as principals seeking to fur-
ther their own interests.
256
This dual trading role has long been a concern of Congress.
In the hearings that led to the adoption of the Commodity Ex-
change Act, there was a recognition that the "highest of good
faith" was required of floor brokers. 7 "It is a peculiar trust, a
relationship that requires as high a degree of integrity as that
required of the attorney or the doctor or anyone else." 258 Con-
gress, however, chose not to ban this practice in the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936. Instead, it placed various probations on
252 At common law, however, a broker was viewed to be acting in the role of a debt-
or with respect to customer funds held in a margin account or which were held as col-
lateral to secure a margin account. A broker could commingle such funds with her own.
MEYER, supra note 189. Commodity futures accounts are margin accounts. This anomaly
was what apparently necessitated the adoption of section 4d.
253 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
254 17 C.F.R. § 1.29 (1992).
255 See Craig v. Refco, Inc., 816 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1987), affd, 822 F.2d 1876 (9th
Cir. 1987); Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1984);
Crabtree Investments, Inc. v. Merrilj Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 577 F. Supp.
1466 (M.D. La.), aftd, 738 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1984).
256 See generally Jerry W. Markham, Prohibited Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17-22 (1989).
257 Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: Hearing on H.R. 3009 Before the House Comm. on
Agric., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935).
258 Id. The floor broker is in a "position of trust." Id at 25. The profession of floor
brokers "requires an extreme order of good faith." Id. at 26. A floor broker should not




floor brokers to reduce abuses that had previously gone unpun-
ished.29
The dual trading problem also concerned Congress during
the hearings that led to the creation of the CFTC. Some argued
that eliminating the dual role would prevent conflicts of interest.
Industry representatives contended, however, that prohibiting dual
trading would lead to a loss of liquidity because floor brokers
trading for their own accounts added volume and liquidity to the
marketplace.
260
Congress's decision on this issue in 1974 was basically a com-
promise. Congress concluded that the CFTC should determine
whether the floor broker should be allowed to engage in dual
trading and to specify the terms under which such trading should
be permitted. The CFTC was specifically ordered to determine the
effect of market liquidity on any restrictions on dual trading.
261
259 In Secretary v. Massey, GFA Dkts. 2 & 3 (Nov. 9, 1933), the Commodity Ex-
change Commission held that the Grain Futures Act did not prohibit abusive practices by
floor brokers. To Amend the Grain Futures Act:., Hearings on &.R? 6772 Before the Senate
Comm. on Agri. and Forestry, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1936); Regulation of Commodity Ex-
changes. Hearing on H.RR 3009 Before the House Comm. on Agric., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-71,
119 (1935). The Commodity Exchange Act sought to fill that gap by specifically prohibit-
ing those practices. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b-6c (1988).
260 See generay Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Agric. and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, 672, 686, 696, 702-15, 721, 738, 741, 747, 756, 761-62, 765, 768, 781, 812,
823, 848, 861, 863-64, (1974); Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195, 198, 203-05, 213-14, 216, 230, 233, 248, 253, 254, 266, 270-71,
273, 275-76, 283-84, 287, 313, 319, 331, 332-33, 341, 342, 368, 370, 374, 376, 383-84, 386-
87, 396-99, 404, 411-12, 426, 432, 435-37, and 439 (1974); Hearings Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong:, 2d Sess., pt. 2, 445, 450-54, 453, 455, 467,
473, 475, 498, 506-07, 513, 521-23, 525, 527-32, 550-54, 561-63, 580-81, 611-12, 617, 639
(1974).
A representative from one brokerage firm stated that it did not permit its employ-
ees to trade for their own account where they serviced customers. This witness testified:
We feel that the man involved should be concentrating on the customer's mat-
ters and not on his own trading. Commodities are volatile, there's always sub-
stantial risk of economical involvement that would distract the man or perhaps
even get him in over his head. And, we just think we live in a fish bowl. It is
like Caesar's wife, we would rather lean to the extreme of showing the customer
that we give you an opinion or some advice we hope it is objective, because we
have no ax to grind.
Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Agri. and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 513
(1974). This witness, however, stated that dual trading by individuals on the floor of the
exchanges raised more complex problems. Id.
One government official also argued that floor brokers should be prohibited from
trading for their accounts while they are executing customer orders because of the con-
flict of interests presented by dual trading. H.R REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51
(1974).
261 Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1396 (codified as
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The CFTC responded by adopting regulations that required
the exchanges to establish minimum standards for dual trading
floor brokers. These regulations were designed' to preclude floor
brokers from acting to the detriment of their customers and trad-
ing for their own accounts. 262 The CFTC coupled this regulatory
approach with an effort to require time stamping of orders at or
about the time of their execution on the floor of the exchanges.
This was designed to allow abuses to be more easily detected. The
CFTC was thus seeking an "audit trail" so that it could determine
whether floor brokers were abusing customer orders while they
were trading for their own account. That effort, however, was
largely unsuccessful. Only recently, after some highly publicized
scandals, has the CFTC acted to impose more effective audit trails
in the pits. 263 Congress has also recently enacted legislation to
curb this practice.2"
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6j (1988)).
262 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1992). Among other things, this regulation prevented a broker
from trading in front of a customer to obtain a more advantageous price for his own
account to the exclusion of the customer. Id
This approach is in stark contrast to that undertaken by the SEC which prohibits
members of national securities exchanges from initiating orders for their own accounts
while they are on the floor of the exchange except under tightly controlled conditions.
17 C.F.R. 240.lla-1 (1992). See generally 5 LOUIS LOSS &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 2531-44 (1990).
263 In 1989, the government announced that it had conducted two massive "sting"
operations on the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. About
48 floor brokers and floor traders were later indicted. Although subsequent trials of some
of the indicted traders were not a complete success, many others were convicted or pled
guilty. See generally DAVID GREISING & LAURIE MORSE, BROKERS, BAGMEN AND
MOLES--FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN THE CHICAGO FUTURES MARKETS (1991); Jerry W.
Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopol)y-Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
977 (1991); Markham, supra note 256. The exchanges are now experimenting with
handheld computers as a method for assuring a more effective audit trail. Seth Fason,
Jr., Computers Spell Change in the Pits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at Cl. In the meantime,
abuses continue.
264 This legislation substantially restricts this practice, particularly in trading pits with
sufficient liquidity to obviate the need for dual trading or where exchange monitoring
systems are sufficient to guard against abuse. H.R. REP. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1989); Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590
(1992); see H.R. REP. No. 978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1992). See generally S. REP. No.
191, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1989). Meanwhile, abuses continue on the futures markets.




C. The Federal Courts
The federal courts have been even less receptive to the impo-
sition of fiduciary duties than the CFTC. Several federal courts
have imposed a scienter requirement under the Act, thereby ex-
plicitly or implicitly rejecting the CFTC's initial conclusion that
fiduciary duties under the Commodity Exchange Act obviated the
necessity for such a showing. 5 The federal courts, however,
have been less consistent in other areas in defining the scope of
fiduciary duties under the Act.
In Hlavinka v. CFTC,2  the Seventh Circuit stated that the
application of fiduciary duties to a broker would depend on
whether the customer was relying on the broker's expertise and
judgment.267 Earlier, the Seventh Circuit had concluded in C=TC
v. Heritage Capital Advisoiy Services, Ltd.,2 s that only brokers oper-
ating discretionary accounts would be viewed as fiduciaries. In
United States v. Dial,269 however, the Seventh Circuit stated that a
broker is a fiduciary to his customers and this requires disclosure
of conflicts of interest in the broker's trading.' The Seventh
Circuit also held in Anspacher & Associates v. Henderson21 that a
broker owes a fiduciary duty to execute orders, faithfully. The
court was of the view that this was a duty that was in addition to
obligations arising under the Commodity Exchange Act, citing
United States v. Dia
2 72
265 See supra note 238.
266 867 F.2d 1029 (7th Cir. 1989).
267 In Blavinka, the customer argued that, because the broker there was not a dis-
count broker, the broker had a fiduciary duty to advise the customer fully on market
changes and risks. The CFTC rejected that claim and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at
1033.
268 823 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1987).
269 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
270 In Dial, the broker solicited customers to engage in transactions that were large
enough that they could affect market prices. The broker would then trade before the
transactions were entered in order to profit. The Seventh Circuit stated that a fiduciary is
acting as an alter ego to the principal and the principal "trusts the fiduciary to deal with
him as frankly as he would deal with himself-he has bought candor." Id. at 168.
The decision in Dial involved a criminal prosecution under the mail and wire fraud
statutes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988). In another commodity futures prosecution, the
defendant contended that he did not stand in a fiduciary relationship with prospective
customers and did not owe them a duty of disclosure. The Seventh Circuit responded
that mail fraud charges could be sustained without establishing a duty to disclose. United
States v. Biesiadecki, 933 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1991).
271 854 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1988).
272 An interesting question is whether the Seventh Circuit was suggesting in Anspaczer
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The Dial court relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,273 as the basis for its con-
clusion that a broker is a fiduciary to his customers. The Marchese
decision was in turn based on a Supreme Court decision under
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, a statute involving a position
of special trust and confidence and of doubtful application to the
duties of brokers.27 4 Indeed, in other decisions, the Ninth Circuit
seems to have taken the sliding scale approach to fiduciary du-
ties-applying greater duties as the broker's control over the
customer's account increases.2 75 The sliding scale approach also
seems to have been followed by other courts, at least in practice.
For example, the Fifth Circuit stated in Romano v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith,276 that a broker owes fiduciary duties to
customers that vary according to the relationship between the bro-
ker and the customer. This would involve a determination of
whether the customer or the broker controlled the account
2 77
that the fiduciary duty found in Dial created a private right of action for the customer
in An.padzer. Most courts have rejected implied private rights of action under the mail
and wire fraud statutes. See, eg., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1979);
Bell v. Heath-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977).
273 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1984).
274 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). In Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected the decision in
Capital Gains as a basis for finding fiduciary duties under SEC rule 10b-5 because it was
of special application to investment advisers. Id. at 471 n.11.
275 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Trabulsi, Civ. No. 83-5987 (9th
Cir. Sept. 27, 1984), the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished memorandum decision, stated
that a brokerage firm has no fiduciary duty to a customer beyond the execution of or-
ders when it is acting simply as an agent of the customer. In another decision, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act applied to a
breach of fiduciary duty by a broker. There, the practice at issue was churning (ie., ex-
cessive trading of a customer account controlled by a broker). Yopp v. Siegel Trading
Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,708, at 31,001 (9th
Cir.), withdrawn pending petition for reh'g, 770 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1985), withdraum by stipu-
lation, No. 83-6250 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1986).
These two cases suggest that the Ninth Circuit is, in practice, applying a sliding
scale approach to fiduciary duties-imposing such duties more broadly where the broker
controls the customer's account. The court in Yopp, however, relied on the Gordon deci-
sion by the CFrC, so the court may have had something broader in mind. If so, it may
wish to reconsider its position in view of the CFTC's overruling of the Gordon decision.
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
276 834 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
277 The decision in Romano, must be considered in light of a subsequent Fifth Circuit
decision that relied on state law to conclude that a customer was not owed fiduciary
duties by a commodity broker. See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
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The First Circuit was more enthusiastic in Schofield v. First
Commodity Corp.17' There the court cited the CFTC's decision in
Gordon for the proposition that the failure to inform an investor
of the risks of commodity futures trading is a breach of fiduciary
duty that violates section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 9
Since Gordon has been overruled by the CFTC, that view is placed
in some doubt."'
In Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 281 the Tenth Circuit
took a more restrictive approach, holding that section 4b of the
Commodity Exchange Act does not impose fiduciary duties. The
court noted that section 4b is a fraud standard. In contrast, appli-
cation of fiduciary duties is designed to eliminate the need to
meet the requirements for establishing fraud. For example, fiducia-
ry duties impose per se liability on a trustee for self-dealing, while
section 4b imposes fraud standards such as scienter that fiduciary
duties sought to avoid by utilizing such concepts as constructive
fraud.8 2
278 793 F.2d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1986).
279 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
280 See supra note 239-41 and accompanying text.
281 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1986).
282 Federal district courts have also considered fiduciary duties in the context of the
Commodity Exchange Act. For example, in Wilkinson v. Rosenthal & Co., [1987-1990
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 124,328 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1988), the dis-
trict court held that brokers owe fiduciary duties to customers even in nondiscretionary
accounts. See also In re Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(claim of breach of fiduciary duty could be made under Commodity Exchange Act);
McBlaine v. Jack Carl Assocs., 705 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (failure to comply with
customer's trading instructions was reckless and was a violation of fiduciary duty);
Kearney v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 701 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (negligent breach of
fiduciary duties does not establish a violation of section 4b of the Commodity Exchange
Act); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 693 F. Supp. 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dis-
cretionary account authority imposes fiduciary duties); Nanlawala v. Jack Carl Assocs., 669
F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (fiduciary duty claimed in trading of discretionary account);
Michael Assocs. v. Conticommodity Servs., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 23,626 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1987) (broad fiduciary duties do not apply to
nondiscretionary commodity accounts); Howell v. Friefeld, 631 F. Supp. 1222, 1224
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (broad fiduciary duties apply to a discretionary account but lesser duties
apply to nondiscretionary account); Woods v. Reno Commodities, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 574,
578 (D. Nev. 1984) (broker stands in a fiduciary relationship to customers and this re-
quires full disclosures of all material f"cts); Hagstrom v. Breutman, 572 F. Supp. 692, 697
(N.D. Il1. 1983) (fraudulent conduct is required to establish violation of section 4b rather
than breach of fiduciary duty); Peavey Co. v. Mitchell, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCIH) 99,593 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 1983) (fiduciary duties did not ne-
gate the need for showing scienter under antifraud provisions of Commodity Exchange
Act).
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Several federal courts have found the scope of fiduciary duties
for brokerage firms to be grounded on state law requirements. In
Horn v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., 2 8 the Eighth Circuit held that
the issue of whether fiduciary duties attached to commodity fu-
tures trading is a question of state law. It held that where an ac-
count was nondiscretionary there were no fiduciary duties.284 In
Irine v. Cargill Investor Services, Inc.,285 the Eleventh Circuit stated
that commodity futures brokers would be held to a high level of
fiduciary duty under Florida law.286 The Sixth Circuit also con-
cluded in Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,287 that a commodities bro-
ker is the agent of the customer and, therefore, a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists.2" The Second Circuit has stated that, even
though a broker is not acting as a technical trustee, a breach of
fiduciary duty occurs under New York law where a broker misin-
forms a customer as to the status of the customer's account.
289
In Wasnick v. Refco, Inc.," a district court in the Ninth Cir-
cuit found a breach of fiduciary duty under state law where a
customer was determined not to be suitable for trading in com-
modity futures. That decision, however, was reversed on appeal
because the laws of the state of Washington were found not to
283 776 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1985).
284 Id. at 799-80. In Framland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 871 F.2d
1402 (8th Cir. 1989), the Eighth Circuit stated that any state law fiduciary duty owed to
a customer must arise from the agency relationship with the broker. Similarly, in Ray E.
Friedman & Co. v. Jenkins, 738 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth Circuit held that
Minnesota state law did not apply fiduciary duties to a nondiscretionary futures account.
The court noted that the trader here was sophisticated and reckless and that he "gam-
bled big and lost" Id. at 254; see also Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 853 F.2d 616 (8th
Cir. 1988) (state fiduciary duty claims were not established); Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985) (under Arkansas law there is no fiduciary duty for a
nondiscretionary commodity account).
285 799 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1986).
286 A Florida court held that claims of fiduciary duty under state law are not pre-
empted by the Commodity Exchange Act. Poncy v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., [1987-
1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,530 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. Sept. 27,
1989).
287 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1989).
288 The court made this observation in the context of assessing the validity of a re-
lease of claims against a broker. Id. at 1481.
289 Modem Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 936 F.2d 640, 648 (2d Cir.
1991).




establish a suitability requirement. 1 The Ninth Circuit's decision
tracks the CFTC's present views on suitability.1
2
In Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc.,29 a federal
district court found that a commodity broker owed fiduciary duties
to a customer. On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit certified to
the Mississippi Supreme Court questions that sought to determine
what, if any, fiduciary duties commodity brokers owe to their cus-
tomers. 4 The Mississippi Supreme Court responded that a cus-
tomer seeking speculative profits was owed no duty. by the broker
to prevent the customer from committing financial suicide. The
court stated that the fiduciary duties of a broker end with the
duty to carry out a customer's instructions.2
5
State courts have also considered the imposition of fiduciary
duties on commodity brokers. For example, a Colorado court held
in Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co.29 that a broad range of fiducia-
ry duties would apply to discretionary accounts. It also stated that
negligence could impose liability for fiduciary duty breaches. 7
In Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,"8 however, the Illinois
state court held that a broker's fiduciary duty generally is limited
to its role as an agent of the customer.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Boeck, 9 a Wis-
consin court rejected the then existing CFTC decisions finding
291 911 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1990).
292 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
293 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,520 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 1989).
294 Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990).
The questions certified by the Fifth Circuit are set forth at Puckett v. Rufenacht,
Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 919 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1990).
295 Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,144 (Miss. 1991).
Federal district courts have also considered fiduciary duties in the context of state
law. See ag., Crook v. Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 40, 50 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(fiduciary duties imposed by state common law fraud requirements; but the district court
relied upon the Cordn decision of the CFTC). See generally Foote v. Blumenthal, [1987-
1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,437 (N.D. III. Apr. 12, 1989)
(fiduciary duty is established under state law where a discretionary account is present);
Refco, Inc. v. Troika Inv., Ltd., 702 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (under Illinois law, a
broker is a fiduciary if he controls a discretionary account, but fiduciary duties of agency
still attach to nondiscretionary accounts in the execution of orders).
296 737 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1987).
297 Cf Hudson v. Wilhelm, 651 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (D. Colo. 1987) (under Colo-
rado law there is no per se rule as to the scope of fiduciary duties owed by a broker to
its customers).
298 510 N.E.2d 840 (I1. 1987).
299 377 N.W.2d 605 (Wis. 1985).
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fiduciary duties. The court held that fiduciary duties did not at-
tach to nondiscretionary accounts unless there was an express
agreement providing otherwise. Simply because a customer re-
posed trust and confidence in a broker did not establish a fiducia-
ry relationship. The court found adequate protection in prohibi-
tions against misrepresentations."00  In DeRance, Inc. v.
PaineWebber, Inc.,"1 however, the Seventh Circuit held that Wis-
consin state law would find a fiduciary relationship where confi-
dence is reposed by a customer in the superiority and influence of
the broker.
°2
VI. A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED
The popularity of the fiduciary concept is undoubtedly due to
its flexibility. A court or agency faced with an ethical breach, or a
sharp practice or lapse in judgement that falls short of violating
statutory or common law standards can use the fiduciary concept
to fill the gap in the law and protect those who are disadvantaged
by the activity. The concept also allows the courts and administra-
tive agencies to proscribe socially undesirable activities that were
not anticipated by the legislature or which are too novel for appli-
cation of the strict confines of the common law. It assures that
those who may engage in sharp practices and prey on the unwary
do not escape retribution through legal loopholes."03 The fidu-
ciary concept assures protection to those who are not in a position
to protect themselves and who are dependent on government
regulation for their safety.
The negative side to the fiduciary duty approach is that the
uncertain scope of the concept may discourage socially desirable
activities. The fiduciary duty concept allows an after-the-fact assess-
ment of the conduct of a regulated entity. The decision maker,
with the benefit of hindsight, can assess whether the conduct
measured up to what it believes should have been the proper level
300 Cf. Jacobson v. Western Montana Prod. Credit Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mont.
1986) (a defendant establishing a hedging program for livestock producers owed them a
fiduciary duty and had to use reasonable care in providing advice on hedging).
301 872 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1989).
302 See also Vogel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) I
24,996 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1990) (state law imposes fiduciary duties that vary ac-
cording to whether the account is discretionary).
303 The downside to articulating specific standards for someone who is considered to
be in a fiduciary role is that, as expressed by one SEC official, this may provide a wrong-
doer with a "road map for fraud." Sommer, supra note 93, at 531.
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of care. This is disadvantageous to the regulated entity because of
the uncertainty of how its conduct will look in the piercing light
of twenty-twenty hindsight. The very ambiguity of the concept
serves to induce the entity to curb its conduct well beyond the
strict legal bounds of a statute or an agency's written rules.
304
This may be desirable in achieving high standards of conduct, but
it carries with it the penalty of discouraging aggressive entrepre-
neurial activities. It makes society less competitive.
The fluidity of the fiduciary concept also allows it to be bent
to the will of the decision maker. An active decision maker can
expansively apply the doctrine or a noninterventionist can equally
contract it. The nebulous nature of the doctrine may then be
disadvantageous to the regulated entity or those being protected if
the regulator changes its regulatory philosophy to benefit one or
the other. Rights and remedies become even more uncertain.
Alternatively, as may be the case with the CFTC, the decision
maker may opt for disengagement, leaving it to the market to
winnow out improper practices, while unknowing and unsophisti-
cated customers suffer the consequences.
Another negative feature of the fiduciary duty concept is ex-
emplified by what has occurred in Delaware-the concept may be
used as a guise to second guess business judgments or to other-
wise interfere with the conduct of legitimate business. For that
reason, the fiduciary concept is particularly alluring to an activist
decision maker that wants to thrust itself into the operations of
the entities it regulates.
There is a solution to the issues that arises from the conflict-
ing advantages and disadvantages of the fiduciary concept. That
solution is one that reflects the realities of the marketplace. The
changing nature of the futures markets has reduced the need for




tures markets are becoming increasingly dominated by large insti-
tutional investors. Such investors do not need a trustee to look
after their interests. Once this is acknowledged, the problem be-
comes manageable. Special protections are needed only for a
304 One author has suggested that the courts deliberately keep fiduciary doctrine
ambiguous. The courts are trying to keep actors away from marginal behavior. JAC.
Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholder's Fiduciary Responsiblities, 22 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 9 (1987); see also Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (N.C. 1974)
(fraud "is better left undefined lest crafty men find a way of committing fraud which
avoids the definition").
305 Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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small class of customers. Most market participants would not be
affected by those protections. The range of protections that are
needed for this small class of customers is also finite and can be
identified by simple rules adopted by the CFTC which, when cou-
pled with existing antifraud prohibitions, would offer a more ideal
level of certainty and protection.
30 6
A. Identifying the Customers Who Need Fiduciary Protection
The first step in this new approach is to identify the classes of
customers who are in need of special protections. Certainly, large
institutions are not in need of such protections. °7 Indeed, they
are themselves often acting as trustees for their owners (e.g., pen-
sion funds). It is their business to know market risks and to moni-
tor their investments. Institutional investors also have the resources
to, and do, monitor the market to assure that they are receiving
the best execution and to otherwise look out for their own inter-
ests.
3 08
Moreover, institutions have the bargaining power to deal as
equals with their broker. This is reflected by the fact that institu-
tions can, and almost always will, insist on receiving interest on
306 These protections would extend beyond common law requirements. See generally
Arthur L. Shipe, Salesmen as Fiduciaries Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 25 SEC. & COMM.
REG. 1 (1992).
307 In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), a district court took note of Judge Cardozo's admonitions in Meinhard v. Salmon,
supra note 125 and accompanying text. The district court stated that, before such fiducia-
ry duties are applied, the court must determine whether the plaintiff "is entitled to more
than the 'morals of the market place' and the protections offered by actions based on
fraud, state statutes or the panoply of available federal securities laws." Metropolitan Life
715 F. Supp. at 1525. The court held that the plaintiffs before it, sophisticated insurance
companies, were not entitled to the protections of fiduciary duties. Id.
308 Nevertheless, the lack of sophistication in an institution can sometimes be ap-
palling. They seem, however, to be able to take care of themselves when disaster strikes.
For example, a marketing and trading arm of the government of Peru was allowed to
recover hundreds of millions of dollars through actions brought in United States courts
even though the losses stemmed from speculative investments of its own employees.
Minpeco S.A. v. Hunt, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,462
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1989); see also Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742,
744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (company allowed to recover large losses caused by the trading
of an employee that the company knew was a compulsive gambler and a felon); Katra v.
D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), reu'd, 835 F.2d 966 (2d
Cir. 1987) (pension fund investments in futures likened to "lotto"); Evanston Bank v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1014 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discretionary account
mishandled by broker but with bank's alleged knowledge); Siconolfi, Bear Stearns Fined in
Case Involving Savvy, supra note 178, at C1 (punitive and other damages entered by arbi-
tration panel for churning of a sophisticated trader's account).
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their funds that are held in segregated accounts by the futures
commission merchant.' Institutions also aggressively negotiate
commissions with their brokers, which is another reflection of
their bargaining power.310 Further, there are several hundred fu-
tures commission merchants competing for this institutional busi-
ness.' Such competition provides alternative avenues for institu-
tions that do not receive the service they believe themselves en-
titled. Much of the same is true for wealthy and sophisticated
customers. They, have the ability to follow the market and to bene-
fit from broker competition for their, accounts. 12 The level of
regulatory protection needed by these traders is, for the most part,
already in place. This includes antifraud protections and protec-
tion of their funds under the provisions of the Commodity Ex-
change Act."1 '
The exclusion of institutions and wealthy, sophisticated traders
from special protections will cover the vast majority of market
participants. As shown above, however, a small class of customers
in the futures market lack the sophistication or resources required
to trade in the highly leveraged, often volatile futures markets.
3 14
These small traders are often either not well-educated or do not
have the financial sophistication or wealth to hire advisers or oth-
er fiduciaries to guide them. Consequently, they depend on bro-
kers or other commodity professionals for advice and guidance.
That reliance may be misplaced. Neither competition among
brokerage firms for their business nor the feeble bargaining power
of the small customer provide the same measure of protection
309 As noted supra note 254 and accompanying text, CFTC regulations allow futures
commission merchants to retain interest on segregated funds. Those regulations, however,
do not require such retention, and sophisticated investors with bargaining power will
insist on the interest.
310 Angrist, supra note 43, at C1.
311 ELECRONIc BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 11, at 32.
312 Still, wealthy individuals seem frequently to lose money in the futures markets.
Se ag., Todd Mason, Momma, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Work for the Tax Boys,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1991, at C1 (singer Willie Nelson loses most of his assets as a result
of phony futures transactions that were done for tax purposes); Louvdes L. Valeriano &
Amy Stevens, Tisch Brothers Sue Asher Edelman Over Alleged Tax Fraud Scheme, WALL ST. J.,
July 23, 1991, at B3 (wealthy executives experience huge losses from similar transactions);
Mercedes McCambridge's Son's Note Exonerated Her, LA. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 2 (account
of academy award winning actress used by her son to defraud an investment banking
firm through futures trading); see also Stephens, Inc. v. Geldermann Inc., 962 F.2d 808
(8th Cir. 1992) (investment banker allowed to recover from broker for this trading).
313 7 U.S.C. §§ 4a, 6d (1988).
314 See supra note 35-36 and accompanying text.
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afforded to large institutions or sophisticated customers. Most of
the larger, more reputable brokerage firms do not compete for
the business of small customers. Indeed, they impose substantial
net worth or other requirements in order to discourage the unso-
phisticated and unsuitable. Further, most small speculators lose
money in the markets."' This means that even the firms ac-
cepting small accounts have little incentive to provide a high level
of service that would result in repeat business.3 16 To the con-
trary, there is an incentive to trade small accounts as rapidly as
possible to generate a high level of commissions before losses
drive the customer away.
Brokerage firms also have an incentive to lure unsuitable
customers into the market. To cite one flagrant example, in Dwyer
v. Murlas Bros. Commodities, 317an administrative law judge of the
CFTC found a widow unsuitable for trading in commodity futures.
She had met her broker at her husband's funeral and was per-
suaded to invest the proceeds of his life insurance policy in fu-
tures even though her income could not support her. Needless to
say, she lost all of the insurance proceeds in the futures trading.
Surely, some rule should exist to prohibit such conduct. Neverthe-
less, as previously noted, the CFTC has rejected a suitability con-
cept under the Commodity Exchange Act. 18
Small, unsophisticated customers are in need of special
protections that can only be implemented through government
regulations. Identification of those customers would involve estab-
lishing net worth or other financial tests to exclude institutions or
alternative trading experience requirements for individuals. For
example, a customer with one or more years (or even less) of
315 About 90% of customers lose money in their trading. Marvin v. First Nat'l Mone-
tary Corp., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,190 (C.F.T.C.
Mar. 11, 1988); Elderd v. First Commodity Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,655 (C.F.T.C. June 8, 1987). See generaly 120 CoNG. REc. 2932
(1974); U.S. DEP'T AGR., TECHNICAL BULL. No. 1001, AN ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRAD-
ING IN GRAIN FUTURES (1949); MARKHAM supra note 5, at 41; HIERoNYMUs, supra note 7,
at 258-63; POWERS supra note 25, at 18-19; Shipe, supra note 306.
316 See generaly Shipe, supra note 306, at 59-60.
317 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuL L. Rep. (CCH) . 20,520 (C.F.T.C. Nov.
21, 1977), dismissed, No. R 77-98, 1979 C.F.T.C. LEXIS (C.F.T.C. Jan. 24, 1979).
318 Se supra note 228 and accompanying text. In the case in which it rejected the
suitability concept, the CFTC was unmoved by the fact that the customer was disabled,
unsophisticated, and unable to afford losses in operations as speculative as futures trad-
ing. Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,345 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 12, 1984), rev'd [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,250 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 5, 1986).
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active trading experience in the futures markets would not need
the guiding hand of a fiduciary, even if that customer is not
wealthy or well-educated.
Such a regulatory approach is not novel. The SEC already
exempts institutional and sophisticated investors.from many of the
disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws. For example,
SEC rule 506 allows offerings of securities to be made to "accredit-
ed" investors without registering those securities with the SEC. 19
The Securities Act of 1933 states that accredited investors may
include large institutions as well as "any person who on the basis
of such factors as financial sophistication, net worth knowledge,
and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under
management qualifies as an accredited investor" under such stan-
dards as may be set by the SEC. 2* The SEC has, pursuant to
this authority, defined accredited investors to include, among oth-
ers, financial institutions, business associations with assets in excess
of five million dollars, and individuals with net worth exceeding
one million dollars. 21 Similar tests, as well as trading experience
exemptions for knowledgeable investors, could be employed under
the Commodity Exchange Act.
322
The CFTC is already loosening existing regulatory require-
ments for institutions. It has adopted a rule that will relieve com-
modity pools and commodity trading advisers from CFTC disclo-
sure requirements for customers who qualify as "accredited" inves-
tors. 2' This rule is "based upon the preniise that accredited in-
vestors are 'sophisticated investors' who are 'capable of protecting
their own financial interests and would benefit from reduction of
the unnecessary costs currently associated with providing them
with such investment opportunities.' "324
319 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1992).
320 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (1988).
321 17 C.F.R. § 203.501(a) (1992). The SEC has also acted to facilitate the develop-
ment of markets where institutions can trade securities. Harold S. Bloomenthal, POR-
TAL-A NASDAQfor Restricted Securities, SEC. FED. CORP. L. REP., Jan. 1990, at 89.
322 A novice customer could also be removed from the category of those needing
special protection after he has acquired experience in actively trading his account for a
specified period of time.
323 17 C.F.R. § 4.7 (1992). The CFrC rule imposes standards for accredited investors
even more stringent than those imposed by the SEC. Barbara Durr, Managed Futures In-
dustry Given First Break, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at 26.
324 CFTC Proposed Rule on Accredited Investors, SEC. REG. & L REP. (BNA), Jan. 24,
1992, at 117-19 (citation and footnote omitted). The CFTC is also simplifying account
opening procedures for large institutions and sophisticated customers. CFTC Interpretive
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The specially protected class of customers should also include
those with discretionary or controlled accounts unless they are
exceptionally sophisticated. Historically, such accounts have been
of particular regulatory concern,325 and the CFTC has already ac-
cepted the necessity of imposing greater fiduciary duties on bro-
kers controlling a customer's trading. 26 This approach is also re-
flected in the CFIC's regulations governing commodity trading
advisers and commodity pool operators. For instance, because of
the control and influence they exercise over customer trading,
current CFTC regulations for brokerage firms that control
customers' trading have been more comprehensive than for other
registrants.
3 27
One area of concern will be the establishment of a methodol-
ogy for determining what constitutes a discretionary account. Gen-
erally, a discretionary account would include those accounts where
the broker has been given express authority to trade without first
consulting the customer. A discretionary account may also be
found in the absence of actual written discretionary authority, as
where the broker exercises de facto control as a result of the igno-
rance or trust and confidence placed in the broker by the custom-
er. The broker may also operate under de facto authority where
the trading limits or instructions of the customer are so broad or
vague as to give the broker effective control.
Fortunately, the CFTC has regulations and case law already in
place to deal with the identification of discretionary accounts. One
customer protection rule that the CFTC did adopt requires bro-
kers to have a written authorization from the customer before
Letter No. 92-4 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 17, 1992). Congress also recently granted authority to the
CFTC that allows it to exempt from the Act institutions trading swaps and other hybrid
instruments. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 8590
(1992); see H.R. REP. No. 978, 102d Cong. 42-44 (1992).
325 In 1938, the Commodity Exchange Authority conducted an investigation of man-
aged accounts. It discovered that these accounts were often solicited through false and
misleading statements. Account controllers commonly allocated profitable trades after the
fact to their own or favored accounts at the expense of other customers. U.S. DEPT
AGRIc., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATION 36-37
(1939); U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., CIRCULAR No. 539, COMMODITY EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATION,
TRADING FOR OTHERS IN COMMODITY FuTuREs (Oct. 1939). In 1968, the Commodity Ex-
change Act was amended to apply its antifraud provisions to such schemes. 118 CONG.
REC. 23,652 (1967); S. REP. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968). Nevertheless, such
abuses have continued. See, eg., Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1987); CFTC v.
Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979).
326 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
327 See 17 C.F.R. 4.1-.32 (1992). The CFTC is, however, now in the process of loosen-
ing those restrictions. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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exercising discretionary trading in the customer's account. 2 The
CFTC rule does not require a writing where the broker is merely
exercising time and price discretion in executing a customer or-
der. 29 This allows the customer to rely on the broker's time and
place advantage in determining when an order should be execut-
ed, but requires the customer to specifically authorize the quantity
and commodity interest to be traded.'3 CFTC cases on churning
claims have also established a body of law on whether a
customer's account was under the de facto control of a broker
(i.e., one element of a churning claim requires proof that the bro-
ker exercised discretionary control over the customer's ac-
count) 331
B. Fiduciay Duties for "Protected Customers"
The next step in the process of protecting unsophisticated
customers (the "Protected Customers") is to identify and define
the protections they need. This may be accomplished by regula-
tions that are simple and few.3 2 The broker, for example,
328 17 C.FR. § 166.2 (1992).
329 Id.
330 Id See generally Morris v. Stotler & Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,080,
at 38,046 n.18 (C.F.T.C. June 27, 1991); Wolkon v. Refco, [1987.1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,509 (C.F.T.C. July 14, 1989).
331 For example, in Secrest v. Madda Trading Co., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,627 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 14, 1989), the CFTC held that the
existence of an express grant of discretionary control will give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of control. CFTC cases further establish a methodology for ascertaining the
existence of de facto control in the absence of an express grant of such authority. In
Smith v. Siegel Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH)
21,105 at 24,454 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 3, 1980), the CFTC identified the following non-exclusive
list of factors as demonstrative of broker control over a customer's account:
1) a lack of customer sophistication 2) a lack of prior commodity trading experi-
ence on the part of the customer and a minimum of time devoted by him to
his account 3) a high degree of trust and confidence reposed in the associated
person [i.e, the broker] by the customer 4) a large percentage of transactions
entered into by the customer based upon the recommendations of the associated
person 5) the absence of prior customer approval for transactions entered into
on his behalf 6) customer approval of recommended transactions where the
approval is not based upon full, truthful and accurate information supplied by
the associated person.
(citations and footnote omitted). Accord Ball v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,184, at 24,874 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 2, 1981).
332 Caution is in order. Regulations to protect the weak should be clear, but they
should be narrowly focused. As the Supreme Court stated long ago with respect to the
regulation of commodity futures:
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should be required to fully explain the nature of futures trading,
any trading program planned for the customer, the risks involved
and the extent of losses that may reasonably be expected if the
trading program does not work."'3 The broker should also be re-
quired to advise the customer of any change in trading strategies.
Further, customers should be given a special short form notice
whenever the open or closed commodity futures trading in their
account reflects a specified percentage loss of account equity (e.g.,
ten percent) or some dollar figure (e.g., five thousand dollars).
This assures that customers are on actual notice of losses in their
accounts. Even though present account statements contain such
information, they are often overloaded with information and con-
fusing in presentation."3 4 Further, while it might be thought that
margin calls would put a customer on notice of losses, they are
often explained away by brokers or their effect is concealed where
margin is paid from funds already in the customer's account. A
special notice would assure that Protected Customers are on actual
notice of losses in their account.
Brokers handling the accounts of Protected Customers should
further be required to keep themselves apprised of market condi-
tions that may have a material effect on the accounts they con-
trol,"'5 and they should be barred from trading for their own
account.3 6 Brokers should also be required to disclose not only
Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of society to
the probable. Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catas-
trophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want. It is true that suc-
cess of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that incompetent persons
bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in their turn. But legisla-
tures and courts generally have recognized that the natural evolutions of a com-
plex society are to be touched only with a very cautious hand, and that such
coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social function as a
simple prohibition and laws to stop its being are harmful and vain.
Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1905).
333 Of course, many commodity futures transactions involve the potential of virtually
unlimited trading losses. Further, while many trading strategies may seek to limit those
losses, they are not fail proof. This should be explained to the customer.
334 17 C.F.R. § 1.33(a) (1992). The SEC is now requiring brokers selling speculative
penny stocks to provide a monthly status report to customers holding such securities. 57
Fed. Reg. 18,034 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. 240.15g-6).
335 This is not to suggest that brokers must become human ticker tapes or infallible
in their trading. Vetrono v. Manglapus [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
22,702, at 30,985 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 6, 1985); Flynn v. First National Monetary Corp.
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,396 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 9,
1982).
336 This will lessen the temptation to allocate favorable trades for the broker's benefit
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the amount of any management or brokers fees, but also the
effect of such fees on the profitability of the customer's ac-
count."
7
Some standards previously rejected by the CFTC should now
be reconsidered. The suitability concept is the most controversial
of those proposals. In fact, however, this issue is more apparent
than real. Suitability has long been a part of the regulatory re-
quirements for broker-dealers in the securities industry."' 8 The
number of actions brought for violation of that requirement are
few in number, but the concept is accepted and respected and has
not been shown to have affected market liquidity or desirable
market activity." There is an even greater need for a suitability
requirement in the futures industry. Futures contracts are compli-
cated, highly leveraged, short-term instruments that are traded on
commodities selected for their price volatility.'
Surely, no respectable professional licensed by the federal
government should be authorized to recommend such instruments
at the expense of the customer. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. The problem
of "dual" trading by floor brokers in executing orders for Protected Customers can best
be met by adopting automated small order execution systems such as those used in the
securities industry. Markham, supra note 256, at 1016-20.
337 Several decisions by CFrC administrative law judges and judgment officers have
held that it is fraud not to disclose the effects of a large commission on the ability of a
customer to make a profit. See, eg., Diaz v. First Commodity Corp., [1987-1990 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,164 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 17, 1988) (finding violations
where management fees were so large as to preclude any potential for profit); see also
Morlais v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,942 (C.F.T.C.
Oct. 18, 1990); Hanly v. Commodity Options Specialists, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,912 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 18, 1990). The CFTC, however, has rejected those deci-
sions, concluding that it has no power to regulate commissions or fees. Macurdy v.
Byrne, 2 Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 25,083 (C.F.T.C. July 11, 1991); Johnson v. Fleck,
2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,957 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 20, 1990).
338 WOLFSON, supra note 221, 1 2.08.
339 1 HAZEN, supra note 220, § 10.7.
340 In proposing a suitability rule in 1977, the CFTC stated that:
Commodity customers are often unaware of, or inattentive to, the substantial risk
of loss in commodity trading. Since futures contracts can be purchased on rela-
tively small margins (thus giving customers a 'high degree of leverage) and the
market prices of futures contracts are subject to large and rapid fluctuations,
futures traders can lose substantially more than the amount of funds deposited
as original margin .... There is a need for a rule that will prohibit commodi-
ty professionals from encouraging or causing their customers to take risks in the
commodities market that are beyond their capacity to bear. Futures trading may
be unsuitable for customers who do not possess risk capital or who are seeking
production of income or preservation of capital.
Proposed Standards, supra note 219, at 21,928.
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to customers whose finances or business acumen make them un-
suitable for such trading. This is not just a theoretical concern.
There remains in the futures industry a class of customers, albeit
decreasing in number, whose suitability for futures trading is
doubtful.-"1  Claims made by unsophisticated and unknowing
commodity futures customers continue to fill the reporters.
42
Still, the commodity futures industry neither accepts nor respects
the application of the suitability concept to futures trading, and
the CFTC has declined to adopt a suitability rule in the face of
heavy industry opposition." However, CFTC rulings have re-
solved some of the concerns associated with suitability. For exam-
ple, the CFTC has adopted part of the SEC's so-called "shingle"
theory that requires brokers to have a reasonable basis in fact for
the recommendations they make to customers.344
The CFTC has also caused the National Futures Association
("NFA"), the industry's largest self-regulatory body, to adopt a rule
that the CFTC viewed to be the equivalent of a suitability rule.
45
The self-regulatory bodies are also the chief means by which the
suitability rule is applied to the securities industry. M 6 Extension
of the NFA rule to the other self-regulatory bodies in the futures
industry would seem to be in order to assure uniformity of regula-
tion among the self-regulatory bodies in the futures industry. This
would also assure more uniformity within the securities industry,
which is becoming increasingly integrated with the futures mar-
kets. This extension of the suitability concept would also do much
to alleviate criticism of customer protection in the futures indus-
try.
3 47
341 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
342 The Commodity Futures Law Reporter published by the Commerce Clearing House is
an apt chronicle of the claims made by such customers. See also 13 & 13A JERRY W.
MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS (1990).
343 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
344 See Hannay v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 23,936, at 34,282 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 21, 1987); Syndicate Sys.,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,289, at 32,788 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1986); 1 HAZEN, supra note
220, § 10.6.
345 Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,250, at 32,675 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 5, 1986). Actually, it only requires
supplemental risk disclosure to those who may be unsuitable. Walter C. Greenough, The
Limits of the Suitability Doctrine in Commodity Futures Trading, 47 Bus. LAW. 991, 997 (1992).
346 1 HAZEN, supra note 220, § 10.7.
347 A more novel approach may simply be to adopt objective standards that make
customers with net worths or incomes of less than a specified amount per se unsuitable.
This may sound draconian, but most responsible brokerage firms already impose such
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The CFTC's reversal of its Gordon decision also leaves a gap in
the level of protection from negligent acts by a commodity profes-
sional. Some protection, however, is present in the form of a sepa-
rate antifraud provision applicable to account controllers acting as
commodity trading advisers or as commodity pool operators. That
statute imposes a negligence standard for liability.' Another
CFTC rule has also reduced concern here by prohibiting some of
the more egregious abuses in the handling of customer or-
ders.3
9
Still, there are gaps, and more protection may be needed in
the form of a due diligence requirement such as that previously
proposed by the CFrC." ° Presently, there is no CFTC rule to
govern the failure to use due diligence in the absence of
fraud.35' The adoption of such a rule would establish, among
requirements so that they may avoid the inevitable lawsuits that arise when unsuitable
customers lose money from trading high risk instruments.
In proposing a suitability rule, the CFTC asked for comments on using such objec-
tive standards. The CFTC stated, however, that:
While specific standards would no doubt be easier to administer and en-
force . . . they do not seem to take into account the varying circumstances of
individual customers and the many other factors that affect suitability. An indi-
vidual with a relatively large net worth might have little capacity for risk taking
if he has many dependents and large financial commitments. Conversely, an
individual with a relatively small net worth may be in a position to take compar-
atively large risks-for example, a person with no dependents and a steadily
rising income.
Proposed Standards, supra note 219, at 21,930.
348 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1988). See Messer v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909 (11th Cir.
1987), amended in part on rehg, 847 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1988); First Nat'l Monetary Corp.
v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334 (6th Cir. 1987); CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1979) (no scienter requirement for this antifraud provision); Taylor v. Peabody, [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 21,926 at 27,995 n.1 (C.F.T.C. Nov.
17, 1983) (same); First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982) (same).
349 17 C.F.R. § 155.3 (1992).
350 For example, this antifraud provision still leaves a gap for brokers who are not
subject to that provision. 7 U.S.C. § 6o. The CFTC also stated in its release proposing its
customer protection rules that brokers "should exercise care in the choice of floor bro-
kers and associated persons who handle orders should be properly trained." Prposed Stan-
dards, supra note 219, at 21,936. There was some doubt whether brokers are liable for
the conduct of floor brokers they select to execute their customers orders. S. REP. No.
101, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1989). Compare Buran v. Lerman, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 24,874 (C.F.T.C. July 6, 1990) with Sherman v. Sokoloff, 570 F. Supp. 1266
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) and Balfour MacLaine, Inc. v. National Coin Exch., 697 F. Supp. 835
(E.D. Pa. 1988). New legislation now makes brokerage firms liable for the conduct of
floor brokers, Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590
(1992); see H.R. REP. No. 978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
351 Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988). At least
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other things, that brokers must use special care in executing or-
ders of Protected Customers who are not in a position to monitor
their own orders to assure their proper execution."5 2 Again, this
rule could be limited in scope to Protected Customers to reduce
any undue regulatory burden."5
A last measure of protection needed for Protected Customers
involves supervisory requirements. The CFTC currently has a
broad, though somewhat vague, rule governing supervision. Specifi-
cally, the CFTC rule states that brokers and other registrants must
"diligently supervise the handling" of customer accounts.5 4 This
rule was also a part of the CFTC's original customer protection
proposals. In its proposed form, the CFTC had specified in some
detail what types of supervision were to be required, particularly
for discretionary accounts.355 In adopting a more generic rule,
the CFTC stated that the proposals were guidelines for supervisors
to follow in meeting the requirements of the rule."5 ' More is
needed for Protected Customers. Indeed, the CFTC has already
recognized the special supervisory needs for at least one set of
customers-those trading in commodity options."7  Protected
one court, however, has found an implied duty of due diligence. Thomson McKinnon
Sec., Inc. v. Moore's Farm Supply, 557 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
The CFTC's proposed due diligence rule stated that due diligence includes the
principle of "customer first," (ie., that the broker not trade in front of the customer in
order to obtain a more advantageous price for the broker). Proposed Standards, supra note
219, at 21,936. Subsequently, the CFTC adopted a rule that required the exchanges to
prohibit such practices. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3 (1992).
352 Proposed Standards, supra note 219, at 21, 936. The CFTC rule proposal stated that,
"Due diligence also means the careful and efficient handling of customers' orders. For
example, orders should be transmitted in a timely fashion to the trading floor." Id.
353 Institutional customers or experienced traders are not in the same need of pro-
tection as Protected Customers are for a due diligence rule. The former can follow ex-
change prices and determine whether they received a good execution. If not, they can
complain or move their business elsewhere, a threat that will insure that their brokers act
diligently.
354 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1992).
355 Proposed Standards, supra note 219, at 21,934. ,For example, the rule proposal
would have required a supervisor to review and approve each transaction entered by a
broker for a customer's account over which the broker had discretion. Id.
356 Protection Rules, supra note 224, at 22,624-625.
357 Historically, commodity options have been the subject of serious abuses in the
commodities industry. Robert C. Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 1978 DUKE
LJ. 1095 (1978); Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two
Regulatory Approaches and Their GConflis, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741 (1983); John Schobel & Jerry
Markham, Commodity Options-A New Industry or Another Debacle, Sec. Reg. & L Rep.
(BNA) No. 347, Special Supp. (Apr. 7, 1976). After a series of scandals arising shortly
after its creation, the CFTC was forced to suspend virtually all commodity options trad-
ing. 17 C.F.R. § 82.11 (1978). See generally Extend Commodity Exchange Act Hearings on H.R.
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Customers should have the benefit of those protections in com-
modity futures as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
This country received the fiduciary concept from England
with a great deal of enthusiasm. It was expansively applied to an
ever increasing number of relationships far beyond the field of
trusts where it seems to have sprouted. The results have often
been ambiguity, confusion, uncertainty, and backtracking as legal
philosophies change. This has been most visibly reflected in the
fields of corporate and securities law. The application of fiduciary
duties to the commodity futures industry is also engendering that
same ambivalence.
The CFTC's switch in position on scienter has heightened the
need to consider whether at least some futures customers are in
need of a greater level of regulatory protection. Their only protec-
tion now is an antifraud provision that may offer no greater pro-
tection than a common law fraud standard."' 8 More is needed.
First, a class of Protected Customers should be identified. They
should include the unsophisticated, the inexperienced, and those
whose accounts are traded pursuant to discretionary authority.
They would not include institutions, the wealthy, or the financially
sophisticated. Second, a limited number of protections should be
adopted for these Protected Customers. Those protections should
be set forth in a limited number of specific rules that would re-
place the uncertainty of the vague protections of fiduciary duties
that may not even exist in this important part of the financial
services industry. These protections would include special alert
notices of trading losses, a modest number of other disclosures, an
extension of existing supervisory requirements and self-regulatory
rules on suitability, and the adoption of a "due diligence" rule
that would be limited in application to this small class of Protect-
10285 Before the House Subcwm. on Conservation and, Credit of the Comm. on fgria, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978). Excluded from the suspension were commercial traders of
commodity options-they were able to fend for themselves. 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1978). The
CFTC later allowed options trading to go forward on the exchanges under a set of rules
that imposed special safeguards for customers trading these instruments, including addi-
tional supervisory requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 33.1-.29 (1978). The CFTC required the
exchanges to impose these special supervisory requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 33.4 (1978).
358 Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990);
Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1985); Nanlawala v. Jack Carl Assocs.,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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ed Customers. In this way, Protected Customers will receive protec-
tion without creating the ambiguity, confusion, and uncertainty
characteristic of fiduciary principles.
